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Abstract:

Foreign-born migrants—a group rarely compared with both internal migrants and long-term residents—are often positioned as the most disadvantaged South African urban population. We use data from a 2008 cross-sectional household survey conducted in Johannesburg to compare social capital and livelihood advantages between foreign-born migrants, internal migrants, and long-term South African residents. Our findings challenge contemporary social capital and migration theories and emphasise the need to explore the heterogeneity of urban migrant populations by showing that (1) foreign-born migrants have better urban livelihood outcomes, and (2) indicators of social capital are not necessarily associated with improved livelihood outcomes.

Keywords: livelihoods, migration, social capital, urban South Africa
The most prominent literature on international migration has stemmed from the “Global North”—or the “developed” world—and often depicts foreign-born migrants as disadvantaged across a range of livelihood outcomes compared to the host population—the native-born. This work has provided insights into the popular sociological concept of social capital (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Palloni et al. 2001; Portes 1998), the calculated decisions as to why migrants move away from or return to their country of origin (Borjas 1989; Massey et al. 1987; Munshi 2003), how over the course of several generations, international migrants develop strong ethnic and national ties in their destination countries—known as cumulative causation theory (Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1998), and why second and third generations succeed or fail to gain paths to upward social mobility (Gans 1992; Kasinitz et al. 2008). In this process, however, foreign-born migrants may be systematically discriminated against—whether through overt or covert policies—as seen through residential segregation (Iceland and Scopilliti 2008), exclusion from the mainstream society of the destination nation (Crul and Doomernik 2003; Simon 2003), or being essentially forced to perform the lowest paying and least prestigious jobs due to their migration status (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). We see the myriad of disadvantages that international migrants face in their destination countries and it is easy to believe that all foreign-born migrants are disadvantaged as such. Importantly, we have also seen research indicating that these migrants may be the healthiest (Markides and Coreil 1986; Markides and Eschbach 2005; McDonald and Kennedy 2004, among numerous others) and most motivated individuals (Waters 1999)—thereby improving nations’ economies (Borjas 1995; Friedberg and Hunt 1995).

However, we know little about how foreign-born migrants’ livelihoods compared to those of internal migrants because it is presumed, or perhaps a reality in some countries, that the native-born population is generally advantaged or privileged in the “Global North”. The purpose
of our paper is to delve into this line of inquiry through an ideal urban case study in the “Global South”—Johannesburg, South Africa. South Africa’s majority black, native-born population is largely impoverished and thereby not necessarily advantaged over foreign-born migrants who often come from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nigeria. South Africa is Africa’s wealthiest country and Johannesburg is the continent’s wealthiest city which attracts both foreign-born and internal migrants, due to a perceived opportunity to improve their livelihoods. Thus, the case of Johannesburg is a relevant point of departure for such a study in Africa as it functions on the continent similarly to the ways in which Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, London, and Paris do in North America and Europe, respectively. But, unlike what we see in these other cities, both foreign-born and native-born new-comers to Johannesburg are forced to compete for scarce resources within the same contentious urban spaces as the long-term native-born residents. So we seek to find which of these groups holds various livelihood advantages and whether social capital—as noted in the international migration literature—is a mechanism by which these advantages are achieved. Our findings in Johannesburg are counterintuitive—with respect to the broader migration literature—and force us to question whether our citizenship-based distinctions rooted in the social scientific tradition of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003) are appropriate in dynamic urban settings, and how to better assess social capital which often predicts migrants’ livelihood advantages.

Social Capital

Social capital theory, in conjunction with migration theories, drives the analysis presented here. In a simplistic sense, more social capital should be related to higher livelihood outcomes on the macro level in communities, cities, states, and nations (see Putnam 2000). Migrants’ lives in the “Global North” have been shown to be improved with higher levels of
social capital or community, ethnic and family connections in their destination city (Palloni et al. 2001; Philips and Massey 2000; Zhou and Bankston 1994). Within their calculations, potential migrants presumably factor their abilities to harness all forms of capital available to them including their social capital—which often emerge from these already established social networks. More specifically, Mexican migrants to the United States have been the primary population of interest in such neo-classical economic explanations about migration (Massey et al. 1987; Munshi 2003). Ultimately individuals are believed to make rational choices based on the cost-benefit estimations of staying at home or migrating abroad (Borjas 1989; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969).

Bourdieu (1986, 51) originally described social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relations of mutual acquaintance and recognition,” which entitles those with social capital enhanced ability to acquire economic and cultural capital and presumably, upward social mobility. Coleman (1988) built upon this theory by examining how “obligations and expectations”, trustworthiness of others, the degree of “information-flow”, norms, and sanctions all comprise social capital; social capital could be used to acquire human capital such as education or labor skills to ultimately improve one’s livelihood or reproduce social structures. Burt (1992 and 2001) and Lin (1999 and 2001) then argued that social capital is actually derived from expanding one’s social networks through “weak ties” by bridging “structural holes” and thus theories of social capital and social networks essentially converged in the field. Burt’s and Lin’s research draws heavily on Granovetter’s (1973) prominent work on the utility of “weak” ties. But perhaps the most salient conceptualization of social capital emerged from Putnam’s (2000) work which measured social capital mainly through the amount of one’s civic
engagement in formal group membership (including non-governmental organizations, political parties, religious groups, and social clubs, among many other forms), and thus one’s community ties, in addition to differing degrees of trust (“thick” and thin”) among community members. Putnam found that those with greater levels of social capital have increased individual prosperity and improved livelihoods and that this is a result of utilizing a mixture of “bridging” and “bonding” social capital (which are analogous to “weak” and “strong” network ties).

The “Global North” has also provided excellent case studies of how social capital operates in densely populated and often impoverished urban settings too, which can guide urban social capital studies in the “Global South”. In densely populated North American urban settings, we have seen that various types of social capital for both native-born and foreign-born individuals are not always correlated with improved livelihoods (Lochner et al. 2003) or more cohesive communities (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004). Moreover, neighborhood spatial dynamics—often created by racial or ethnic divisions—may concentrate disadvantages to certain populations, thereby nullifying the potential benefits of acquiring social capital (Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999). This line of social capital research shows that both space and place are important factors to consider, especially for migrants (see White and Lindstrom 2005).

Regardless of the approach, social capital theory has been extensively developed and used in the “Global North” but its further development and use in the “Global South” has been relatively limited (see Heller 1996; Madhavan and Landau 2011; Maluccio, Haddad and May 2000 for some notable exceptions). Most markedly though, Woolcock (1998) and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) suggest that factors like pervasive poverty, a lack of law enforcement, or explicit discrimination directed at minorities can severely limit the potential for social capital to develop and raises doubts whether it is advantageous to acquire it. These propositions echo the findings
in densely populated urban areas of the “Global North”. The case of Johannesburg may provide the balance needed to bridge social capital literatures of the “Global North” and “Global South”.

Contemporary critics of social capital theories (de Haas 2010; Portes 1998; Wacquant 1998) have questioned the normative nature of social capital and whether it may have negative consequences for migrants and others who acquire it; social capital may economically hinder individuals through group sanctions which restrain freedom and exploration of ties beyond the group. More recent work has also raised issues regarding the applicability of existing migration models (where there are definitive characteristics and social expectations of host and migrant communities) to African cities (Madhavan and Landau 2011), and more generally the “Global South”. These concerns follow those of Perlman (1976) who challenged common beliefs about the homogeneity and marginalized position of migrants in comparison to the host society in Brazil. The accuracy of such notions about social capital and migration needs to be determined more extensively in the “Global South” and in this case to also improve our understanding about differential livelihood outcomes among internal migrants, foreign-born migrants, and long-term South African residents in Johannesburg.

**Johannesburg, South Africa**

Despite its relative wealth and status as the financial center of the African continent, there are many areas of Johannesburg—situated in the wealthy Gauteng province—where an increasing population of the “urban poor” face extreme difficulties in their day-to-day lives (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2000; Von Frantzius 2004). South Africa was the most unequal country globally in 2008 (World Bank 2012b)—with respect to income distribution (as measured by the Gini coefficient)—and one that is currently ranked 123 out of 187 in the world on the Human Development Index (United Nations 2011). Despite this, Johannesburg continues to
attract both internal South African migrants and foreign-born migrants from across the southern African region and beyond. The majority are moving into Johannesburg’s center and, increasingly, the informal and peri-urban periphery, in search of improved livelihood opportunities within what is still perceived as a city of opportunity.

Contemporary migration and urban spatial dynamics cannot be fully understood outside of the context of recent and ongoing xenophobic attacks. In 2008, South Africa and the rest of the world became aware of the underlying and overt tensions between citizens and those born elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Starting in Johannesburg, ethnic and national tensions boiled over, resulting in over 60 murders (predominantly of the foreign-born) and the displacement of around 100 000 individuals (see Landau 2011; Misago, Landau and Monson 2009; Polzer and Igglesden 2009). The documented discrimination (see Crush 2011; Landau 2005; Landau 2011 Neocosmos 2010) and extrajudicial deportations (Amit 2010) directed at foreigners in South Africa also depicts the bleak realities that many foreign-born individuals must contend with in their day-to-day lives.

While such events would make it seem that a primary marker of urban tension and inequality lies in comparisons of the native and foreign-born, there are equally important differences among South Africans moving into these urban spaces and those who are more established residents. In reality, the foreign-born population is much smaller than imagined (Segatti and Landau 2011)—roughly between 4% and 7% of the South African population depending on estimates of the undocumented population—and internal mobility is a much more prevalent phenomenon (Landau and Gindrey 2008; Segatti 2011; World Bank 2012a). Internal migrants from rural areas often search for employment in urban areas, but job scarcity and higher costs of living may actually further impoverish these individuals (Posel and Casale 2006).
Migrants from within Gauteng province (where Johannesburg is located) have greater levels of unemployment than other South African migrants, while non-migrants/long-term residents in such areas have lower standards of living (Oosthuizen and Naidoo 2004). However, South African migrants in the city are not always “worse off” than their rural counterparts or “better off” than long-term residents; residential mobility within Johannesburg (and Gauteng more broadly) is associated with both low and high household socioeconomic statuses (Ginsburg et al. 2009). Livelihood trade-offs are found to exist as internal migrants in Johannesburg tend to be healthier than long-term South African residents, but more likely to live in informal housing (de Wet et al. 2011).

Since there is a history of the native and foreign-born competing in marginalized urban spaces in South Africa (see Landau 2011; Misago, Landau, and Monson 2009) as well as competition among the native-born, it would seem that individuals in these groups would be unlikely to develop strong social ties to one another. However as mentioned previously, the literature on social capital tends to suggest that the development of cohesive communities across various groups is advantageous to the larger population and individuals (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000), and that individual ties across social groups allows individuals to access scarce or “embedded” resources (Burt 1992; Burt 2001; Lin 1999a; Lin 1999b) which improve people’s livelihoods. There is some evidence in South Africa to suggest that trust—an indicator of social capital—varies between foreign and native-born groups (Madhavan and Landau 2011) but more evidence is needed to understand whether having high levels of social capital is advantageous in urban South Africa.

We therefore examine how residency status (internal South African migrants, foreign-born migrants and long-term South African residents in Johannesburg), social capital, and
livelihood outcomes are related. The two main relationships we are interested in are: (1) how Johannesburg residency status is associated with social capital (given our knowledge of inter and intra-national tensions and inequalities in South Africa); and (2) how residency status and social capital are related in explaining livelihood outcomes and why one group in Johannesburg may be advantaged or disadvantaged over another. A social capital index—based on respondents’ senses of community cohesiveness which includes perceptions of trust and safety—is created to evaluate differences in social capital among these groups while household income and a household asset index (as a proxy measure of household wealth) depict the quality of life amongst these Johannesburg residents. Thus, the social capital measure (which is largely based on Putnam’s conceptualization) and livelihood outcomes are key variables in this study in efforts to answer our two research questions.

Data and Methods

The data in this study came from the Regional Network on AIDS, Livelihoods and Food Security (RENEWAL) study which was conducted in 2008 by researchers at the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. The ACMS used cluster-based stratified random sampling (see Vearey et al. 2010 and Vearey 2012 for further details) in order to access households in several communities of the Johannesburg metropolitan area. Four communities were included in the survey: Sol Plaatje, Berea, Hillbrow, Jeppestown. Sol Plaatje is an informal settlement in the western part of the Johannesburg metropolitan area\(^1\) while Berea, Hillbrow, and Jeppestown are inner-city suburbs\(^2\). Sol Plaatje is

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\(^1\) Since the time the data were collected, Sol Plaatje has become an increasingly formalized township.
on the western edge of the Johannesburg metropolitan area and quite inaccessible from
Johannesburg’s Central Business District (CBD), Sandton (an even larger hub of commerce in
northern Johannesburg), and the relatively affluent and nearby township of Soweto in part due to
insufficient public transport services. As a consequence, individuals living in Sol Plaatje must
travel great distances to acquire goods and access services—such as healthcare—to meet their
basic needs. In 2008, running water was still not widely available, roads had not been
constructed, and residents had no access to electricity. The inner-city suburbs of Berea, Hillbrow,
and Jeppiestown on the other hand are located in or near the CBD where respondents can easily
shop for goods and access public transport. While these areas have electricity and running water,
each building or flat within these buildings does not necessarily have either. The inner-city areas
are also extremely densely populated and experience some of the highest crime rates in the
country. Thus this dichotomy between the informal settlement and inner-city suburbs indicates
the stratified character of the sample. Households within each community were clustered
(through extensive mapping) and then randomly selected from within these clusters. The ACMS
initially sampled 292 and 195 households (n=487) in the inner-city and informal settlement,
respectively. Due to missing cases in the key dependent and independent variables, this study has
a sample size which includes 277 and 172 households (n=449) in the inner-city and informal
settlement, respectively.

Respondents—either the head of the household or another adult in the household who
was willing and able to speak about the household—were then approached in person at their

2 Suburbs in Johannesburg are not separate political entities as they are in the United States, but
rather they function as neighborhoods which are legally recognized and strong markers of
identity.
homes and asked to complete an extensive survey on topics including migration histories, living conditions, basic needs access, remittances, diet, health care access, HIV/AIDS, community engagement, and perceived trust of others nearby.

One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to begin examining the associations between residency status and social capital. Social capital was measured through an index based on Putnam’s (2000) conceptualization (noted above) which was derived from a list of binary outcome questions regarding one’s inclusion in formal and informal neighborhood events, the perceived level of community response to local problems, and the willingness of others to help respondents in times of need, as well as other related indicators. Indices based on community engagement, levels of trust, and other ways of measuring group membership in evaluating social capital have been used in “Global North” (Putnam 2000; Veenstra 2000) and “Global South” settings (Narayan and Pritchett 1999) but this does not mean that there are not concerns about the validity and reliability of such indices in their respective settings (Glaeser et al. 2000; Madhavan and Landau 2011). Each response which suggested that respondents felt included in community activities, were trustworthy of others, or felt safe in the neighborhood was worth one point while negative responses to such questions were worth zero points in the index. Respondents could achieve a score between zero (low/no social capital) to nine (high social capital). The social capital index is normally distributed and did not need to be transformed for ANOVA. The data do not allow for social network analysis and therefore the approach towards social capital (where

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3 The questionnaire was structured in a way that not all “yes” answers signified the potential presence or acquisition of social capital. For example, for the question asking if there was a situation where respondents could not find help when it was needed at some point in the past year, a “yes” answer would indicate a lack of integration in the community.
we could examine “structural holes” and related access to “embedded resources”) that Burt (1992; 2001) and Lin (1999a; 1999b) take could not be measured. But these available indicators, as crude as they may be, are aligned with Putnam’s (2000) approach which suggests that social capital is often a “public good” which individuals can access within or through their communities.

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was then used to examine respondents’ household incomes and a household asset index and their associations with residency status, sex, age, and social capital (which all serve as controls). The natural log of household income was taken in order for it to be normally distributed in the OLS regression but we caution the reliability of measures of household income given that a representative of each household reported on all of the household members’ incomes⁴. As a result, we created a separate additive household asset index to address these concerns and to see if there were any disparities between

⁴ We also took the natural log of income to counter the effects of outliers. But to properly address the potential problems of outliers with respect to household income among our three groups, we conducted two separate analyses for our regression models—one with household income outliers and one without. The results were virtually the same except for very minor variations in regression coefficients and no changes in their direction or levels of significance. So the loss of 12 outlying cases (based on household incomes that were three standard deviations or more above their respective group means) was not worth the added explanatory power of keeping them (and not further reducing the sample which was already reduced due to some missing data).
the two measures. The index included nine potential items and possession of any (working) item in the household was worth one point: radio, refrigerator, television, cell phone, sewing machine, video/DVD machine, and a generator along with whether the household had electricity and running water. The index initially appeared to have a bimodal distribution, but when controlling for the aforementioned independent variables and social capital measures, the distribution of the index’s residuals show that it is indeed normally distributed. Therefore, OLS regression was used to assess this household asset index with respect to residency status, sex, age, and social capital measure.

We used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to generate several alternative asset indices and the direction of the regression results remained same as those in our additive index although there were minor variations in the magnitude of the coefficients. In some instances—depending on the weighting of different components of the index—some regression coefficients’ level of significance were reduced to p<0.10. We realize that this may slightly change the interpretation of our results, but in the absence of any strong reasoning to say that a cell phone should be weighted more heavily than a generator or radio for example, in the urban South African context, we were comfortable with presenting the asset index as we have done. It is important to note that even proponents of PCA in “Global South” contexts, like Filmer and Pritchett (2001) acknowledge that PCA is not necessarily the best method for determining such indices. Hargreaves et al. 2007, who create a similar type of index in the rural South African context, use PCA without considering the qualitative importance of household items to South African families. For other critiques and methods in generating such indices, please see Booysen et al. (2008) and Kolenikov and Angeles (2009).
Respondents’ Characteristics

In efforts to examine social capital theory, and in part to evaluate some of the limitations associated with analyzing the dichotomy of host and immigrant populations, respondents in this study were divided into three categories as mentioned above: internal South African migrants (n=162) consisting of those who moved to Johannesburg less than five years preceding the survey, foreign-born migrants (n=142), and long-term South African residents of Johannesburg (n=145) which consisted of those who had lived in Johannesburg for five or more years. Since Johannesburg is highly transient with only about 55% of South Africans and 31% of foreign-born individuals having occupied their current residence for more than two years (Landau 2009), living in the city for 5 years would seem to indicate long-term residence status 6. Lastly, and although the results are not presented, we conducted separate analyses among the documented (having a work permit, study, permit, visitor’s permit, permanent residence, or South African ID) and undocumented (including asylum seeking and refugee) foreign-born respondents in order to see if it was worthwhile or relevant assess these groups separately. Of the foreign-born, 47% of the respondents had official documents while the other 53% did not. As it turns out, both groups did not significantly differ in terms of household income and the social capital coefficients are insignificant, but the documented individuals had a significantly higher average score for the asset index when controlling for sex, age, and social capital (p<0.05) 7. Had there been significant

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6 The figure of 5 years is chosen somewhat arbitrarily nonetheless. However, after consulting with the ACMS staff and their affiliate researchers, this cut-off point is appropriate given research indicating the transiency of residents in Johannesburg. This measure is also used in Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004).

7 These results are available upon request.
differences or effects between these groups across all measures it may have been a useful endeavor to break down the foreign-born group in this manner in efforts to explain a more nuanced version of livelihood advantages and disadvantages with respect to social capital. But since only one indicator differed between these groups, we kept the foreign-born as a homogenous category. Respondents’ characteristics are further broken down in Table 1.

Table 1 about here-

Limitations

It is unlikely that these data are representative of individuals in Johannesburg but considering the difficulty and dangers in accessing such respondents, these data provide great insight into otherwise relatively and often statistically invisible populations—meaning that inner-city and peri-urban residents in South Africa are often difficult to enumerate, let alone get detailed information about residents via lengthy surveys, due to their transience, investment in remaining hidden to avoid authorities, or the logistical difficulties of accessing such individuals in these areas which have disproportionately high crime rates (see Vearey 2012; Vigneswaran 2009). Unfortunately, the data are cross-sectional so causal claims cannot be made—the aforementioned difficulties in simply accessing respondents in urban South Africa also make it

8 Respondents’ ethnicities would seem to be relevant to include in these models but upon further review of the distribution of the livelihood outcome dependent variables, the only differences among ethnic groups indicated that the Ndebele and Shona were advantaged. However, individuals from these ethnic groups hail from Zimbabwe and therefore including ethnicity as an independent variable proved redundant. Further, age-squared is used in both OLS regressions since it is statistically significant even when controlling for age.
difficult to track and retain respondents in longitudinal analyses. Rather, associations between residency status, social capital and livelihood outcomes are examined. Also, due to the small sample size, few conclusions could have been drawn if South African migrants were broken down by their home province of origin\textsuperscript{9}. The foreign-born, regardless of when they arrived in Johannesburg, were grouped as one category due to insufficient cases if these individuals were to be broken down into recent migrants and long-term residents. Similarly, foreign-born migrants were not broken down by their country of origin\textsuperscript{10}.

Since there are only 18 foreign-born migrants living in the informal settlement who participated in the survey, comparisons across South African migrants, foreign-born migrants, and long-term South African residents regarding their location of residence likely reflects a selection bias of which four possibilities (or a combination of possibilities) exist: (1) the potential foreign-born respondents had the abilities to avoid living in the informal settlement, (2) they had been already driven away from the informal settlement, (3) they were in hiding during a period

\textsuperscript{9} The provinces of South Africa are: Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng (where Johannesburg is located), KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, North-West Province, and Western Cape.

\textsuperscript{10} Foreign-born respondents came from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Belgium. With the exceptions of Ghana (n=1), Nigeria (n=1), and Belgium (n=1), the rest of the respondents came from Southern African countries in close proximity to South Africa. Individuals from Lesotho and Swaziland would have migrated the least distance from their homes (as Lesotho and Swaziland exist within South Africa’s borders) while those from the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have travelled the furthest.
of heightened xenophobia, or (4) the stratified random sampling method simply did not select as many foreign-born individuals\textsuperscript{11}.

The sample consists of 55.93\% (n=250) females and 44.07\% (n=197) males\textsuperscript{12}. This uneven gender distribution was not part of the research design. Survey research in sub-Saharan Africa is conducted almost exclusively during daylight hours in order to minimize the dangers that participants or researchers may be subjected to. As a result, male heads of the household may not be as readily available during the daytime as they are more likely to travel to their place of work\textsuperscript{13}. However, the survey findings indicated that a larger proportion of households were headed by females than initially anticipated.

Lastly, our key outcome variables: the social capital index, annual household income, and the household asset index obviously cannot fully capture respondents’ social capital or livelihood advantages. The social capital index utilizes available survey questions that are appropriate in trying to evaluate Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital, but they may not completely capture the relevant proxy measures of social capital in the urban South African context, which is a considerably different setting compared to the United States or a European nation. Qualitative research would be able to give further insight into the validity of such a measure in this setting,\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} Formative work prior to the RENEWAL study indicated that the first possibility, that the foreign-born simply were choosing not to live in the informal settlement, seems the most likely out of these scenarios.

\textsuperscript{12} Unfortunately, there were missing cases on gender for 2 individuals within the 449 for this study.

\textsuperscript{13} This is not to say that females cannot be heads of their households. In fact, female headed households were commonly sampled in the survey.
but was not available to us at the time. The household income measure (as mentioned above) could be problematic since one respondent is accounting for the incomes of all members of that household and respondents may inaccurately report others’ incomes. However, since the household asset index shows similar patterns to those found in the household income measure (as seen below), both measures improve the robustness of our findings in terms of what constitutes livelihood advantages in this setting. Whether household income or the presence or absence of various assets in households effectively describes these Johannesburg residents’ livelihoods is unconfirmed and would need to be determined through future qualitative work.

Multivariate Results

Our two research questions inquiring as to how Johannesburg residency status is associated with social capital and how respondent’s livelihood outcomes are associated with residency status and social capital guide the process of understanding the differential livelihoods among internal migrants, foreign-born migrants and long-term South African residents. One could predict that—in line with existing literature about international migration in the “Global North”, the discrimination on behalf of the police and government towards nonnationals in South Africa, the xenophobic violence associated with the time period when these data were collected (2008), and exclusion or self-exclusion from South African communities and services (for example, see Landau and Freemantle 2010; Vearey, 2011)—the foreign-born would be the most disadvantaged group in terms of social capital and livelihood outcomes. There are also likely additional selection effects in the data, like respondents’ motivations or physical health—that may make it seem as if the foreign-born are advantaged or disadvantaged compared to the internal migrants and long-term residents—which we cannot account for though.
We could also predict that long-term South African residents would have developed higher levels of social capital than their internal and foreign-born migrant counterparts during their time in the city. Consequently, they should have higher household incomes and more household assets than internal and foreign-born migrants. However, as seen below, the results tell a different story and lead us to further question the concept of social capital in Johannesburg and the intertwined relationship between residency status, social capital, and livelihood outcomes.

The social capital index (see Table 2) shows that internal migrants have significantly higher (p<0.05) mean scores than foreign-born migrants which suggests that this group of South Africans feels more engaged within their respective communities in the inner-city suburbs or the informal settlement. Surprisingly, the long-term South African residents do not have significantly higher predicted mean social capital scores than internal migrants. As noted above, there is some expectation that if groups of individuals are in an area for an extended period of time, they would likely develop more social ties and become more engaged within the larger community. The long-term South African residents do not appear to have significantly higher mean social capital scores than foreign-born respondents—suggesting that they have levels of social capital somewhere in between these two groups. If we take a slightly lower standard for statistical significance though (p<0.10), we see that long-term South African residents have slightly higher mean social capital scores than the foreign-born which is what we would expect based on the existing social capital literature.

14 “Community” is quite a fluid and debatable term in the South African context though due to multi-ethnically settled townships and urban spaces which can even further divide native-born (and sometimes foreign-born) groups (see Comaroff 1998; James 1997).
So, on the whole, we see that the foreign-born at least *appear* to have a slight disadvantage with respect to social capital in Johannesburg compared to the internal migrants and long-term South African residents. But, we must be cautious of the way in which we measure social capital (whether it affectively assesses social capital in the inner-city and informal settlement settings) and whether the differences in mean social capital scores are substantively important. In an ideal situation, we would also have complete network data which would allow us to see which of these groups were more likely to be brokers and bridge structural holes—thereby constituting another form of social capital (Burt 1992; Burt 2001). Or we could look at whether network closure—the tendency for social capital to be derived within closed groups such as families, ethnic communities, or churches (among other groupings)—leads to certain livelihood advantages or disadvantages (Coleman 1988). The use of multiple approaches to social capital would thereby improve our confidence in how social capital operates in urban South Africa. In the absence of these other analytical methods, the statistically significant differences (or lack thereof) in our social capital measure between groups provide a base for us to understand differential livelihood advantages between these groups.\textsuperscript{15}

In the next test to understand the differential livelihoods among the internal migrants, foreign-born migrants, and long-term South African residents we examine respondents’ average annual household incomes (see Table 3).

\textsuperscript{15} We tested several versions of this social capital index and even split the social capital index into separate civic engagement and trust measures, yet the same results were consistently found. Therefore, we decided to keep one aggregate measure that encompassed these dimensions of social capital.
In models 1, 2 (controlling for sex and age), and 4 (controlling for sex, age, and social capital) it appears that the foreign-born actually have an advantage with regards to household income over the internal migrants and long-term residents based on significant negative associations between (the natural log of) income and being an individual in these two categories. Further, long-term Johannesburg residents do not have significantly higher household incomes than internal migrants when controlling for these variables and the direction of the main effect of residency status suggests that long-term residents may have lower household incomes than internal migrants. Model 3 shows that the social capital index is negatively correlated with household income although this association is not statistically significant and the effect in model 4 is weak as well. A partial F-test, which examines whether the addition of the social capital index significantly improves the strength of our model and understanding of the variation in household income, confirms that this index does not add any more explanatory power than that found in model 2. It appears that social capital has no impact whatsoever on household income in this model but the negative association with household income is consistent in both models so it is conceivable that the small sample size is hindering us from seeing a significant relationship.

-Table 3 about here-

To see if this trend continues across other livelihood measures though, we assessed the household asset index and similar patterns were observed in the OLS regression of the household asset index (see Table 4) as seen in the household income regression, except social capital is significant. Residency status is statistically significantly associated with the household asset index in models 1, 2, and 4 and internal migrants and long-term South African residents continue to be disadvantaged compared to the foreign-born. Again, long-term residents do not appear to hold an advantage over internal migrants and the trend continues to show that the long-term
residents may have a livelihood disadvantage (although the difference in these residency status coefficients is not statistically significant). More important though is that model 3 shows that social capital is significantly (p<0.01) negatively correlated with a greater number of household assets and continues to be in Model 4 (p<0.01) when controlling for residency status, sex, and age. Unlike in Table 2, a partial F-test shows that the social capital index has a significant (p<0.05) impact on our understanding of the disparities in household assets compared to model 2, which does not have this index. So it appears that social capital is associated with a lower household asset score, but whether this relationship is substantively important or not, is unknown.

In order to assess whether social capital mediates the relationship between residency status and household assets, or that residency status mediates this relationship, we ran an interaction effect of residency status and social capital. An interaction effect that would nullify the main effect of residency status would suggest that residency status mediates the relationship between social capital and household assets. Conversely, an interaction effect that would nullify the effect of social capital would suggest that social capital mediates the relationship between residency status and household assets. Unfortunately, the interaction produced too much collinearity within this step and therefore could not be calculated. This indicates that the impact of our social capital measure on residency status is minimal and that by including this interaction effect, we were essentially measuring residency status twice in the model.\textsuperscript{16} When we tried to introduce other variables such as location of residence (inner-city/informal settlement) or type of

\textsuperscript{16} We also ran this interaction in the previous model on household income and as expected, saw the same outcome.
housing (formal/informal), their effects drastically overtook other effects in our models\textsuperscript{17}. But since location of residence and type of housing are intimately related to residency status (as reviewed in the literature above), these effects are endogenous and suggest that some other mechanism (or combination of mechanisms) is driving the disparity in livelihood outcomes between the foreign-born, internal migrants, and long-term South African residents in Johannesburg.

Table 4 about here-

Even though the social capital index is statistically significant in the fourth model in Table 4, which signals that it may be a mediating variable, it is clear that residency status is the driving force behind these associations with household assets. Nonetheless, social capital continues to be negatively associated with income—having less social capital appears advantageous.

\textit{Discussion}

The two research questions that we examined produced somewhat unexpected results. On the one hand, it is not surprising given the time period (of heightened distrust towards and violence directed at the foreign-born) when the RENEWAL study was conducted, and more generally that foreign-born individuals in South Africa are marginalized and discriminated against quite frequently (Amit 2010; Crush 2011; Landau 2005; Landau 2011; Neocosmos 2010), that the foreign-born have lower social capital (based on our Putnam-like measure) than both native-born groups and therefore \textit{seem} disadvantaged. On the other hand, since social

\textsuperscript{17} Additional variables such as educational attainment and location prior to moving to Johannesburg would seem like relevant control variables, but due to a large number of missing cases, we were unable to include these as controls in our models.
capital is usually viewed as something that is advantageous in improving one’s life by allowing one to gain access to scarce/embedded resources (Burt 1992; Burt 2001; Lin 1999b) or simply a sign of how connected one is to others in their community (Putnam 2000), it is surprising that it is negatively associated with higher household incomes and more household assets, and that the foreign-born in this sample show distinct livelihood advantages over both native-born groups. It would be easy to say that this evidence supports the notion of “negative social capital” (Portes 1998), even though the counter-intuitive effects of social capital have not typically been associated with native-born groups, but we need to be careful in this assessment since the effects of our social capital measure are quite small and minimally associated with livelihood outcomes. While we use measures that are aligned with social capital in the mainstream literature, we cannot be certain that they measure social capital in the urban, South African context. It is more likely that our measure of social capital—even though it is as carefully constructed as possible given our data—does not reflect what social capital actually is in these Johannesburg neighborhoods. These findings call for improved modelling of social capital in the future and how transferable this “Global North” concept is in the “Global South”. Neighborhood effects and spatial dynamics—such as residential segregation—need to be considered to more exhaustively test social capital in Johannesburg, as has been done in densely populated cities in the “Global North”.

Also, while it is possible that the foreign-born respondents who were sampled were those more established than others in their respective communities and the least likely to feel the need to flee, hide, or refuse the interview because of fear of persecution by officials and citizens alike, there appears to be a trend that at least suggests that not all foreign-born migrants in Johannesburg are as likely to be as disadvantaged as prior research and media sensationalism
have suggested. Long-term residents also show a trend of having slightly (although not significantly) lower average annual household incomes and fewer household assets than internal migrants. So simply because they have lived in Johannesburg for more than five years—a lot longer than most migrants—these long-term South African residents are not automatically more advantaged across these measures of their livelihoods than other groups. This further questions how social capital develops as it is difficult to believe that long-term residents have not found ways to develop key relationships with other individuals in their neighborhoods that provide some livelihood advantages whether as a social safety net, a rotating credit association, or a source of food and clothing when in need, compared to the foreign-born and South African new-comers.

But more importantly, we need to closely examine the relationship between residency status and social capital. While the overall effects of residency status and social capital associated with the livelihood outcomes may seem small, a residency status-social capital nexus apparently exists. Qualitative data research on this interaction would certainly improve our understanding of this intimate relationship though and perhaps uncover nuanced forms of residency and more contextually relevant forms of social capital in Johannesburg; such research is currently being undertaken by one of us. This type of work would allow us to further understand if and why appropriate forms of social capital hinder individuals’ livelihood outcomes in Johannesburg and allow for more precise critique on the normative essence of social capital. From there, we could apply qualitative findings into quantifiable measures and more fruitfully evaluate the associations between residency status, social capital, and livelihood advantages.
Conclusions

While these data are not representative of all migrants in South Africa or Johannesburg, they provide unique insight into the livelihoods of often-difficult-to-reach populations that reflect the vast—and growing—inequalities associated with one of the most prosperous cities in Africa. Foreign-born migrants have distinct advantages in the livelihood outcomes of household income and household assets. Long-term residents do not hold such livelihood advantages—and may even be disadvantaged—compared to recent South African migrants despite presumably having had the time to acquire social capital that may improve their livelihoods during their residency in Johannesburg. Since, in this case, social capital is negatively associated with improved or “better” livelihood outcomes and is closely linked to residency status, we challenge common assumptions about the relationship between migration status, social capital and certain livelihood advantages. Alternatively, these commonly used measures may not capture valuable pieces of social capital in these Johannesburg settings but qualitative research into these often fragmented and fluid spaces, with respect to the traditional notions of social capital, will improve such evaluations in the future.

These findings are important in the field of migration and social capital for our perceptions about the extreme disadvantages that foreign-born migrants often face and the seeming benefits of engaging with and trusting the community—regardless of migration status—are challenged. Virtually all theoretical approaches to social capital suggest that social capital is normatively beneficial to an individual or society (see Bourdieu 1986; Burt 1992; Burt 2001; Coleman 1988; Lin 1999b; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000). Since less-desirable livelihood outcomes are routinely found to be associated with social capital measures in this study even when controlling for other individual characteristics, the normative essence of social capital must
be reconsidered and further tested. Theoretical and empirical research such as Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz (2004), de Haas (2010), Lochner et al. (2003), Portes (1998), and Wacquant (1998), though have indicated the potential negative—or at least not advantageous—effects of conventionally defined social capital among foreign-born migrants and the urban poor alike and thus provide critical counter-narratives to the social capital doctrine.

The predominant literature on the disadvantages that migrants face when moving to a new country—like the United States, Germany, or other North American, European, or Australasian nations (see De Jong and Madamba 2001; Lang 2005; Schnepf 2007; Zeng and Xie 2004; for such examples)—paints an image that foreign-born individuals are inevitably disadvantaged in their destination country. Recent critical media and identity studies relating to the xenophobic violence in South Africa (see Landau 2011) reaffirm these academic and media-driven beliefs about perceived and real immigrant disadvantages. But with further sociological research that takes settings in the “Global South” into account in order to examine the relationship between migration, social capital, and livelihood outcomes, as demonstrated in this paper, we will be able to scrutinize these broad conceptualizations of how “hosts” and migrants live in the same contentious spaces. A location like Johannesburg is an ideal urban site to compare social capital and livelihood advantages to research stemming from the “Global North” due to its population density, massive in-flows of internal and foreign-born migrants, and extreme variations in economic and social inequality. Like Johannesburg, places such as Lagos, Nigeria and Nairobi, Kenya could become crucial cities representing major African countries in sociological theory that share these similar conundrums with regards to migrants as major cities in the “Global North”. The data presented here suggests that in spite of the numerous ways in which foreign-born migrants could be disadvantaged in their livelihoods, they appear to be more
successful urban residents than their South African counterparts. Also, the data show that length of residency does not appear to provide any livelihood advantages, as social capital theory implies. Here lies the disjuncture between expected and actual livelihood outcomes, and the conventional sociological theories being tested in South Africa. By involving sub-Saharan Africa in migration and social capital theories, these approaches will be developed more robustly and give greater insight into how seemingly competing groups in contentious spaces manage to improve their livelihoods and gain certain advantages. Complex, unequal, and diverse urban centers like Johannesburg are continuously evolving, leading to shifting spatial dynamics and changes in how city spaces are lived-in by particular urban groups. Over time, these changes may result in increased ethnic divisions; urban researchers, city officials and policy makers should develop improved methods for monitoring and responding to tensions as they arise. More practically, the results of this study should send an important message to South African policy makers: South African migrants and long-term Johannesburg residents in the inner-city and periphery require substantial support in order to improve their urban lives.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents by Residency Status (percent distributions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Internal Migrants</th>
<th>Foreign-Born</th>
<th>Long-Term S. African Res.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner-City Suburbs</td>
<td>63.58</td>
<td>87.32</td>
<td>34.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Settlement</td>
<td>36.42</td>
<td>12.68</td>
<td>65.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>44.10</td>
<td>54.23</td>
<td>34.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>45.77</td>
<td>65.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>53.75</td>
<td>55.63</td>
<td>33.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>30.63</td>
<td>33.80</td>
<td>33.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>17.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>16.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R0</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>14.79</td>
<td>37.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1-2499</td>
<td>36.25</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>41.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2500-4999</td>
<td>25.62</td>
<td>30.99</td>
<td>12.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5000+</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>23.94</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>145</td>
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Table 2: Difference in Means of the Social Capital Index by Residency Status

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Scores</th>
<th>Comparative Difference in Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Migrant</td>
<td>5.67 (1.62)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-Born</td>
<td>5.15 (1.44)</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term S. African Resident</td>
<td>5.50 (1.41)</td>
<td>†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard deviations are in parentheses. †p<.10, * p <.05, **p<.01, *** p <.001
Table 3: OLS Regression of the Natural Log of Household Income Among Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Migrants (Foreign-Born ref.)</td>
<td>-1.338 ***</td>
<td>-1.345 ***</td>
<td>-1.319 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.395)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term S. African Res. (Foreign-Born ref.)</td>
<td>-2.194 ***</td>
<td>-1.922 ***</td>
<td>-1.912 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.405</td>
<td>-0.391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.211 **</td>
<td>0.213 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-squared</td>
<td>0.003 **</td>
<td>-0.003 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>6.836 ****</td>
<td>4.119 **</td>
<td>6.378 ****</td>
<td>4.345 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(1.557)</td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(1.620)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>431</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.064 ***</td>
<td>0.095 ***</td>
<td>0.003 ***</td>
<td>0.096 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Migrants (Foreign-Born ref.)</td>
<td>-1.107</td>
<td><strong>-1.087</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.001</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.001</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term S. African Res. (Foreign-Born ref.)</td>
<td>-1.498</td>
<td><strong>-1.259</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.219</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.219</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex (Male ref.)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>-0.314</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.048</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-squared</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td><strong>-0.157</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td><strong>4.328</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.562</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.909</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.923)</td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.949)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>421</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td><strong>0.119</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.029</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.131</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard errors in parentheses.</td>
<td>*** p&lt;0.001, ** p&lt;0.01, * p&lt;0.05</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Segatti, Aurelia. 2011. “Migration to South Africa: Regional Challenges versus National Instruments and Interests”. *Contemporary Migration to South Africa. A Regional*


