On the 27th of July 2010, Eurostat announced that the European Union (EU) population had broken the half billion mark at 501 million residents (Eurostat, 2010), rising again to 502.5 million people in 2011 (Eurostat, 2011). The main driver behind this, besides recent EU expansion, has been sustained high levels of non-EU net migration since the early 1990s. Across Europe, media attention about this historic population milestone provoked conflicting reactions, from celebration of the success of European integration to concern about overpopulation, increasing immigration and an identity crisis brought by new forms of cultural diversity amidst a profound economic crisis. Such milestone certainly prompts questions such as; who are these half billion Europeans? How many of them lack EU citizenship? How many more EU citizens actually live outside Europe?

Since the mid-2000s, public debate about migration in Europe has dramatically shifted away from the celebration of multiculturalism (or diversity) and towards promoting the integration (sometimes assimilation) of migrant communities and their descendants. Policy-makers have followed this trend along the social cohesion discourse. One policy proposed to this end has been to facilitate access to nationality or citizenship\(^1\) in the country of residence (a

\(1\)

Although citizenship is a broader concept than nationality (membership or legal status), both terms are commonly used interchangeably in the literature (Bauböck, et al 2006) as well as in this paper.
process known as naturalisation). This expansion of the citizenry through naturalisation, has been promoted by human-rights-inspired inclusive policies in the EU, through a process that Joppke (2005) terms the “de-ethnicization” of citizenship. However, these policies have sparked unease about perceived changes to national identity, and political community membership. Partly because of these concerns, States have also promoted the opposite process, namely the development of selective paths that favour ‘co-ethnics’ through the “re-ethnicization” of citizenship (Joppke, 2005). Such tensions between de- and re-ethnicization of citizenship have spurred public debate on the question, ‘who are the citizens of Europe?’ (to paraphrase Bauböck, 2006a).

Globalisation poses challenges to the idea that nation states are primarily defined by the triad ‘territory, people and rights’, and that the world is organised into mutually exclusive nation states (Joppke, 2005). Large and circulatory flows of international migration, cross-border family relationships, and multiple citizenship practices, transcend the ‘spatial match’ between a state’s citizens and its territorial-jurisdictional boundaries (Spiro, 2007; Sassen, 2008). As a result, there has been substantial growth over the past two decades in the number of external citizens – people living outside their country of citizenship - as well as those with dual or multiple citizenship. This has presented a challenge to the traditional meaning of national citizenship (Kivisto & Faist, 2007). Consequently, delineating a state’s ‘population’ (regardless of country of residence) has become a daunting task (Poulain & Herm, 2010).

Together, these trends have important political and legal implications for the non-overlapping nation-state world order. This is specially the case in the context of the highly integrated territory of the EU, where these combined processes have profoundly altered the balance between (expanding) individual rights and (blurring) duties implicit in citizenship regimes (Bauböck, 2009). Such states of affairs have sparked numerous academic debates about the meaning of citizenship in the 21st century and whether it still helps in understanding processes of political membership, identity, sovereignty and equality.
Despite the importance of the new developments described above, research on migration, integration and citizenship has traditionally focused on ‘the destination view’ of these processes, whereby immigration is conceived as a one-off unidirectional flow ending in settlement. Migrants occupy a sort of ‘waiting room’ (Samers, 2009) in which they must ‘adapt’ before nationality can be granted. Over the last two decades, there has been growing interest on the ‘origin view’, understanding the role of sending States in engaging with their diasporas through dual citizenship, and how circular movements and transnational links are created (Levitt & Glick-Schiller, 2004). A central concern from this perspective is whether issues of identity, belonging and citizenship are still shaped by nationally-oriented policies (emigration or immigration) or on the contrary by new forms of citizenship beyond nation states – variously termed “post-national citizenship” (Soysal, 1997), “flexible citizenship” (Ong, 1999), or “multiple citizenship” (Held, 1995). Despite this ‘denationalization of citizenship’ (Sassen, 2008), the state remains the only body with the power and institutional apparatus to guarantee ‘the right to have rights’ (Somers, 2006).

This paper is premised on the view that binary views of origin-destination in migration and citizenship and the current focus on issues of ‘naturalisation’ in one EU country in which migrants are assumed to settle permanently (OECD, 2011), do not fully explain complex contemporary practices of mobility and belonging in the EU. This is reflected in the way that EU citizenship (introduced in 1991 by the Maastricht Treaty) is automatically bestowed upon any member State citizen. The resultant free movement and equal rights of EU citizens have made all EU nationalities essentially interchangeable, blurring the boundaries between nationally-based citizenships, and substantially increasing the worldwide value of an EU passport. At the same time, however, access to EU citizenship is determined by member States’ national legislation, giving them de-facto control on the migration and citizenship policy of all the other member States. This has the potential to create tensions and conflicts between member States (Bauböck, 2006a). Furthermore, this paper argues that EU integration has created two distinct (and so far
poorly studied) processes: discriminatory practices in access to citizenship that favour ‘co-ethnics’ over long-term residents without EU citizenship (*denizens*), and strong incentives for *external citizenship* (i.e. residents outside their EU country of citizenship).

This paper aims to propose the investigation of a subset of these poorly studied populations of external and multiple EU citizens that fall outside the assumed route of a single unidirectional migration flow to one EU country followed by settlement and naturalisation. For ease of reference, this collective will be termed *extrazens* and defined as: people born outside the EU who: a) already have, or have the right and intention to access an EU citizenship via non-residence provisions (ancestry or family connection), OR b) have EU citizenship from a member State but reside outside that State. Very little research has been conducted into the size, characteristics and motivations of extrazens, as well as the legal and mobility strategies through which they access and transmit EU citizenship over generations and space. Correspondingly under-researched are the ways extrazens exercise the freedom of mobility to circulate within and outside the EU, a global space closed to a large proportion of *EU denizens* (non-EU citizens residing in the EU). The paper first two sections review the existing literature on the changing meaning of citizenship and the growth of multiple and external citizenship. The third section argues that the EU citizenship conforms a unique case to understand new, pragmatic access to citizenship through maximising mobility trajectories and ethnic capital. The fourth section proposes a research template with a typology of five broad extrazens’ trajectories. Each of them is then tackled in a separate subsection, illustrating their key characteristics through examples as well as gathering the scarce statistical evidence as a first attempt to delineate the volume and geographies of the different types of EU extrazens. The conclusion brings together all the threads of the paper pointing towards new avenues for research in this fascinating area.

1. **The changing meaning of citizenship; national membership, identity, and exclusion**

Citizenship comprises four dimensions: legal status (membership); rights; political participation; and a sense of belonging (identity) (Bosniak, 2000). This paper adopts a view
closer to the concept of ‘nationality’, focused on status and identity, concerning issues of membership of the polity, as well as subjective ties to a national community. If democracy is defined as a government accountable to its citizens, how do States determine who is admitted as members of ‘the Nation’? Anderson’s (1991) nation building thesis is useful here to remind us how states have formed around members of an ‘imagined community’, within finite borders within which sovereignty is claimed. Citizenship is thus built upon social closure towards outsiders and newcomers, since only exclusive membership ensures distinctiveness and stability (Walzer, 1983). In order to defend equality amongst a State’s members, citizenship status is established by delineating the boundaries for membership, which in turn forms the basis of an exclusive politics and identity (Bosniak, 2000; Sassen, 2008). Any problems associated with the exclusionary essence of citizenship are exacerbated when its boundaries are defined based on kinship, race, ethnicity, religion and even gender and social class (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Such exclusions are often justified by the need for social cohesion, as evidenced by the predominant contemporary political discourse of most EU countries regarding immigrant integration (Phillips, 2011). This creates a core tension between the expansion of individual rights and the prerogatives of States over membership (Faist, 2007).

That tension has unfolded in different ways. On the one hand, there is a dominant conception of citizenship acquisition as a means of immigrant integration, leading to liberalisation and *de-ethnicisation* of citizenship laws, set against the backdrop of an international human rights regime (Faist & Gerdes, 2008). On the other hand, States have also promoted the “*re-ethnicization*” of citizenship (Joppke, 2003). Promotion of re-ethnicization takes two forms. First, faced with the emigration of their own citizens, States provide incentives for their ‘members’ abroad to retain links with their home country, and to transmit home country membership over generations through *ius sanginis* provisions or reduced residency requirements for naturalisation. Second, States have increasingly introduced restrictions on access to citizenship for those considered ‘non-co-ethnics’ or more ‘culturally distant’ migrants. They do
so through limiting *ius solis* provisions for children of immigrants, introducing *ius domicile* (right of residence) prerequisites, or implementing increasingly complex integration requirements (such as citizenship and language competence tests, or DNA tests in family reunification). A survey of changes in citizenship legislation in 33 European countries since 1990, shows that 12 have expanded *ius soli* rights while 7 have actually restricted it or abolished it altogether (Honohan, 2010). Some of these restrictions are increasingly being applied as new immigration admission criteria, justified on the basis that only those immigrants perceived to be able and willing to integrate are welcome, while those who are not should be deterred from entering (Carrera, 2009). Meanwhile, those who can claim ancestry to certain countries get citizenship automatically, regardless of language knowledge or residence history. The tension between ‘de-ethnicization’ and ‘re-ethnicization’ of citizenship lays bare the discriminatory nature of some of the membership rules that determine ‘who belongs’ in Europe.

Further contradictions have also arisen from changes in the traditional Marshallian citizenship model (Marshall, 1950) that assumed political participation, identity and membership to be congruent with the State’s territory and its resident population (Fitzgerald, 2008). Such contradictions primarily relate to the growth of dual or multiple citizenship, and intense transnational migration practices between two or more States (including circular and onward migration as opposed to permanent settlement) (Kivisto & Faist, 2007; Sassen, 2008).

In this paper I contend that, in the context of an integrated EU, the effects of changes in citizenship acquisition and migration practices have yet to be studied in-depth from an inductive perspective of their impact on migrants’ lives, especially for mobility, and under a cross-national, and multidisciplinary lens.

2. **The growth of multiple and external citizenship**

Dual or multiple citizenship is increasing rapidly (Brøndsted-Sejerensen, 2008), and in the future might become the norm in polity membership (Spiro, 2007). Until three decades ago, there was a strong distaste for multiple citizenship since it questions the State’s right to have a
monopoly on membership of its citizens (Vertovec, 2006). Today, according to a range of studies, between 30% and 58% of the world’s countries allow some sort of dual or multiple citizenship (Blatter et al, 2009). The main factors that have contributed to the expansion of multiple citizenship (Kivisto & Faist, 2007) are; large and circulatory migration flows, growing naturalisation rates, use of *ius sanguinis* provisions for co-ethnic citizenship recovery, off-spring of increasing international marriages, birth-right citizenship, gender equality in citizenship transmission, de-colonisation, the end of the Cold War, the lack of violent conflict between most nations, the demise of military conscription, a shift in views of emigrants ‘from traitors to heroes’ and the expansion of the international human rights regime.

The response in some States has been selective towards multiple citizenship. Traditional emigrant nations, including most European countries, are typically more inclined to tolerate multiple citizenship in their citizens living abroad, and to facilitate citizenship transmission to their descendants, than to ease naturalisation requirements for immigrants living within their territory or provide automatic birth right citizenship to their descendants (Bloemraad et al., 2008). By contrast, in traditional ‘nations of immigrants’, multiple citizenship and naturalisation has a much longer history, and is more tolerated. Viewed from the country of ‘emigration’ multiple and external citizenship has been increasingly endorsed over the last decades as an effective tool of foreign policy, since expatriates and trans-border minorities are seen to promote national interests abroad. Furthermore, external voting rights have been enacted in many countries as an instrument to provide political representation and promote remittances and transnational links between the diaspora and the ‘metropolis’.

An obvious consequence of the expansion of multiple citizenship is the growth of *external citizenship* (Bauböck, 2009). Two general cases of external citizenship must be distinguished; i) emigrants living outside (one of) their country of citizenship (who might have multiple citizenship or not), and ii) communities of descendants of emigrants who are increasingly acquiring the nationality of their ancestors without actually migrating anywhere.
This second collective of external citizens in most cases do hold multiple citizenship (unless they have to renounce their original citizenship) and conforms a rapidly growing but largely unknown collective of extrazens.

The growth of external and multiple citizenship (that we could perhaps term extrazenship) has important implications for the relationship between individual rights and state sovereignty. However, these new forms of citizenship have lacked the attention of scholars in political and social sciences (Bauböck, 2009), beyond aspects of external voting rights. Two key factors explain this gap; migrants have been typically perceived only as immigrants and not as emigrants (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002), and the fact that the State cannot ensure equality of rights to its citizens outside its national territory. Furthermore, ancestry and other ‘at birth’ forms of access to multiple and external citizenship has been barely studied (Honohan, 2010), mainly because these ‘new citizens’ are officially considered nationals from birth, and hence never as ‘immigrants’ (Waldrauch, 2006).

Further research is necessary on the relationship between multiple citizenship status and its effects on migrant integration and/or transnational activities. Is tolerance of multiple citizenships likely to enhance, or undermine, political and social integration? Critics of multiple citizenship argue that its growth over the last decades presents a series of theoretical and political concerns related to the rise of neoliberalism in the age of securitised migration and the demise of multiculturalism. Underpinning such concerns is a shift from peoplehood to personhood in conceptions of citizenship (Habermas, 2000), where ‘the common good’ is increasingly underplayed. Some of these critiques are derived from the transnational activities that multiple citizenship permits, and a lack of solidarity and reciprocity among citizens (Faist, 2007). In the opposite camp, proponents of liberal citizenship argue that multiple citizenship encourages naturalisation (Mazzolari, 2009) which in turn enables integration, political participation, and development of transferable political skills (Jones-Correa, 2001; Kejzar, 2009). These theories are yet to be examined in a broad empirical investigation across different countries (Spiro, 2007).
The following quote, from a Swiss company that offers legal advice to obtain a second citizenship, is a good example of such pragmatic uses of multiple citizenship in a pure neoliberal sense:

“Alternative Citizenship and a Second Passport - Freedom to Travel, to do Business, and Security for Life; Today, a person of talent and means need not limit his or her life and citizenship to only one country. Making an active decision with regard to your citizenship gives you more personal freedom, privacy and security. We offer private client citizenship planning. We analyze each client's situation carefully, point out the available options, develop a plan of action and make it happen.” (Henley Global website: http://www.henleyglobal.com/citizenship/ accessed 07 Feb 2012)

This company is not an obscure outlet, but a Swiss wealth management company that placed adverts for several weeks in The Economist magazine next to the off-shore finance section (The Economist, 2011). Its selling points resonate well with neoliberal concepts such us individual and family “freedom, privacy and security for life”, and form part of the justification of using tax havens and ‘off-shore’ to shelter the finances of the wealthy from nation states’ territorial jurisdictions (Shaxon, 2011). Ordinary people however, actually seek multiple and external citizenship as a pragmatic way to open up greater mobility, work and education opportunities as a life strategy for its bearer and her/his family (Ong, 1999), or as an exit strategy in times of economic turmoil (Tintori, 2009; 2011).

One final example serves to illustrate this latter value of multiple and external citizenship, and the increasing tensions it creates upon the non-overlapping nation state, in ways that are not always discussed in the literature. During the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, Canada evacuated almost 15,000 Canadian citizens from Lebanon to safety, the largest such episode in Canadian history (Ponomarev, 2011). Most of these Lebanese-Canadians did not actually have a Canadian home ‘to go back to’, what triggered an agitated national debate about the changing meaning of Canadian citizenship and the duties of the State towards its growing collective of
dual nationals permanently abroad (Jedwab, 2007; Nyers, 2010). The term “Canadians of convenience” was coined in public debates, and amongst the questions raised in the media was whether naturalisation should be reversible if new citizens reside permanently abroad (Nyers, 2010).

Through these, and the various examples and data presented throughout this paper I argue that the mobility implications of multiple and external citizenship have been largely understudied. Joppke (2010) and Spiro (2008) conclude that “the indisputable truth […] is that the value of an immigrant visa by far surpasses that of formal citizenship” (Joppke 2010: 12). Yet, the evidence provided in this paper clearly contradicts this assertion. It is precisely mobility that most dual citizens are after, but the rights bundled within citizenship definitely surpasses by far the most generous migrant permanent residence status granted by any nation. And no other citizenship has more global value than a European Union passport, as it will be discussed in the next section.

3. **The increasing value of EU citizenship**

EU integration is key to understanding the future of citizenship overall, since it constitutes the only existing form of supranational citizenship. Rather than a postnational model, it has been seen as constituting a case of ‘nested citizenship’ (Faist, 2007). EU citizenship confers a comprehensive set of rights and benefits based on the principle of non-discrimination across Europe. Its most practical application is access to a common space of free movement and equal rights (Bauböck, 2006a), in the 31 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) plus Switzerland\(^2\). Most of the literature on intra-EU mobility has focussed primarily on EU-born

\(^2\)For ease of reference and unless otherwise stated, this paper interchangeably uses the terms *EU* and *EU citizenship* to denote the space of the whole EEA and Switzerland (31 countries), as opposed to just the 27 EU member states or the whole of the European continent (44 countries).
populations (only 29% of all migrants), specifically a growing elite of highly mobile young professionals or ‘Eurostars’ (Favell, 2008) educated as part of the ‘Erasmus generation’. However, the far-reaching implications of EU integration for non-EU migrants (also known as ‘third country nationals’) have been largely overlooked. For them, the advantages of acquiring and transmitting the nationality of an EU/EEA country are obvious: access to very fluid international mobility; labour markets; educational opportunities; welfare benefits; voting rights; and political representation; all automatically recognised in 31 countries. It is therefore not surprising that the number of non-EU nationals acquiring an EU nationality has grown rapidly over the last decade both within (Eurostat, 2012a) and outside the EU (Tintori, 2011).

Meanwhile, conversely, the number of EU citizens residing in another member State that acquire an additional EU citizenship has decreased substantially, because of the practical benefits enjoyed by their de-facto ‘European citizenship’ (Waldrauch, 2006). These practical benefits of EU citizenship have important implications for EU migration policy towards Non-EU nationals, both inside and outside the EU.

i) Inside the EU – Onward and return migration of naturalized Third Country Nationals

Non-EU citizens residing within the EU (denizens) are faced with the problems derived from a national piece-meal approach to immigration policy. Even when they may have a permanent right of residence in one EU country, a patchwork of national immigration policies actually excludes them from the same level of interchangeable rights across the EU territory enjoyed by EU nationals. Because of this problem, several initiatives have recommended the creation of a European permanent residence status in the EU (a ‘blue card’) to encourage intra-EU mobility, and even return or circularity (Europe 2030, 2010). Faced with precisely these needs and the lack of such a status for all denizens, non-EU citizens residing in the EU seek to acquire one EU nationality, with all the freedom of mobility that entails, within and outside the
EU, as well as the broader set of rights than those given to permanent migrants through national migration legislation. As argued in Mateos & Durand (2012), which particular EU nationality they acquire is not really relevant, and thus migrants follow the quickest and most effective route that grants them access to EU citizenship, either through residence, marriage, or ancestry. Once they access EU citizenship, they may wish to move to another EU country for work or family reasons, or move out of the EU altogether, an increasingly exit strategy adopted by some migrants facing difficulties during the current economic downturn. Therefore, a collective of migrants actually seek naturalisation, not necessarily as a way to ‘integrate’ or settle, but quite the opposite, to bypass ever more restrictive migration policies in order to be able to come and go as they please. This long term goal is summarised well by the following quote from an interview with a migrant I conducted in London: “As soon as I get the [British] citizenship, I move back to Mexico” (Raul, Mexican, 6 years living in London).

ii) Outside the EU – Ethnic capital and citizenship

Until the 1990s someone with vague ancestral connections to a European country primarily saw these roots from a genealogical point of view, as a curiosity in delineating family history and identity. However, the incentives to draw upon one’s ‘ethnic capital’ (Mateos and Durand, 2012) to ‘recover’ an ancestor’s nationality have become much greater since the aforementioned European integration process. Examples from a range of unlimited ius sanginis provisions in some EU countries will be provided in the next section. By benefiting large populations of emigrant ancestry, these provisions are somehow undermining the immigration control of other EU States and creating serious tensions (Bauböck, 2010b). For example, recent changes in Hungarian and Romanian citizenship laws led the UK to complain in Brussels for promoting ‘ethnic citizenship’ and increasing the size of the population who can enjoy EU freedom of settlement. Conservative media in the UK interpret this as a sign of lack of control in EU immigration policy (Daily Mail, 2010a). However, interestingly, conservative groups in each country where kin minorities originate typically promote these ethnic nationalistic policies, for
example in Italy (Tintori, 2009) or Hungary (Bauböck, 2010b), since they expand the ‘national stock’.

These re-ethnicization trends have created a growing disconnection between the country in which a descendant of European migrants has the right to citizenship, and the actual migration strategy followed by some of these ‘new EU citizens’. Understanding the typologies, geographies, relative sizes and future consequences of these ‘intergenerational return migration’ flows requires taking a broad historical and post-colonial perspective and look beyond conventional data sources.

4. Assessing EU extrazens’ trajectories: empirical evidence and a research template

Despite worries about high levels of immigration into the EU, non-EU citizens only comprised 4% of the EU population in 2010, that is 20.2 million residents, while, in terms of country of birth, a total of 31.4 million residents were born outside the EU (6.3% of the EU population) (Eurostat, 2011). The difference of 10.2 million people between these two alternative constructs of ‘non-EU migrants’ is those residents born outside of the EU but holding an EU citizenship. A substantial proportion of this collective is probably comprised of naturalised migrants, with many others born outside the EU being descendants of EU citizens. However, there are no statistics available to distinguish between these two types of access to EU citizenship; naturalisation and ancestry. Finally, little is known about the other side of the ‘migratory coin’, i.e. those EU nationals currently living outside the EU, comprising EU-born ‘expatriates’, EU-naturalised ‘return’ migrants and some of their descendants.

The range of legal citizenship provisions across the EU and the wider world, as well as the numerous potential migrant situations, presents enormous possible variations for all types of citizenship acquisition. Recent research in the areas of law and political science have shed some light on comparing citizenship legislation internationally, creating valuable taxonomies across the EU (for a recent review see Bauböck (2006b) and a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies edited by Vink and de Groot (2010)). These important conceptual
advancements have not been paralleled with empirical evidence about the actual preferred
citizenship routes and mobility practices, especially regarding external and multiple citizenship.
Contributing towards such a purpose in the case of extrazens is the main aim of this paper.

Extrazens’ migration and citizenship trajectories are here defined as their flows between
countries of residence and between citizenship statuses. Such trajectories are comprised of
sequential migration and citizenship decisions by actors across countries and generations,
following a combination of premeditated and adaptive behaviour. Such behaviour is contingent
on a combination of circumstances or factors; such as countries of residence, mobility history,
nationality/ies, ancestors’ origins, gender, life stage, household composition, information about
legal routes available, and expectations about the perceived value of EU citizenship. These
factors actually form a multidimensional space similar to what Bauböck (2010a) terms as
‘citizenship constellations’. He proposes that this is an opportunity structure in which individuals
are simultaneously linked to several nations and political entities, but differ in their locations
within such a structure as well as in their individual interests and orientation to choose between
alternative citizenship statuses. The EU is a good example of one of such citizenship
constellations and in order to understand it the basic migration and legal trajectories followed by
EU extrazens must first be mapped out.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical diagram of the trajectories followed by EU extrazens
around one particular EU ‘country of interest’ (column B, row 2). The matrix has two
dimensions; citizenship status or nationality (vertical dimension, rows 1, 2 and 3), and place of
residence (horizontal dimension, columns A, B and C). Starting from birth in a non-EU country
(cell A1), the diagram follows the main possible routes to accessing citizenship (rows 1, 2 and 3)
and migration (columns A, B, and C) to, from and within the EU. The majority of the literature
on EU immigration and citizenship focuses on just two processes; first is immigration into a
single EU country of interest through a visa, work permit, etc., subject to immigration policy
(from cell A1→B1), and second is the right to access citizenship through naturalisation (from cell B1→B2). This body of literature largely ignores intra-EU flows (B2→C2 and B3→C3), and return and circular flows outside the EU (flows into A2 and A3), as well as access to citizenship via ancestors (A1→A2 and A1→A3). This paper focuses precisely on these understudied trajectories.

The matrix shown in Figure 1 will be used in the rest of this paper as a research template to investigate the five main types of citizenship and mobility trajectories relevant to extrazens: a) naturalisation, b) intra-EU onward migration, c) ancestry or ‘at birth’ acquisition of citizenship, d) three-way ‘intergenerational’ migration, and e) external citizenship, ‘return’ and circularity. Each of these extrazen routes or types is illustrated with a range of examples and statistical evidence drawn from the scarce literature and data sources available.

a) **Naturalisation**

The great majority of the literature and the available statistics on citizenship focus on the naturalisation route to citizenship. This is the aforementioned A1→B1→B2 route in Figure 1. Waldrauch (2006) compiled comparable statistics on naturalisation for EU15 countries until the mid-2000s (NATAC project) and the EUDO-Citizenship project has extended this to the EU27 countries until 2008 ([http://eudo-citizenship.eu](http://eudo-citizenship.eu)). The OECD and Eurostat have recently made available a comprehensive time series of naturalisation data broken down by country of residence and previous nationality (OECD, 2012; Eurostat 2012a). In 2010, the most recent year available, 794,130 people acquired citizenship of an EU country through naturalisation (Eurostat, 2012a). The cumulative number of naturalisations in EU27 countries between 1998 and 2010 is 8.92 million people, consistently averaging between 650,000 and 775,000 per year since 2000 (Eurostat, 2012a). It is only possible to distinguish between EU and non-EU previous nationals since 2006, and the vast majority of naturalisations (around 90%) have consistently been by non-EU nationals. Naturalisation figures typically drive political and public debates on citizenship, whilst the other types of access to citizenship discussed in this paper usually pass unnoticed. The
political angst generated by the immigration-naturalisation link is well illustrated by the following quote. After an Eurostat press release reported that the UK had granted the largest number of EU naturalisations between 2002 and 2010, the UK Immigration Minister, Damian Green, declared; ‘these statistics show why we must tighten our immigration system and look to be more selective about who we give British citizenship to’ (Daily Mail, 2010b). No evidence has been found for debates about restricting ancestry-based access to British or other EU citizenships.

b) Intra-EU onward migration

Those extrazens who naturalise in one EU country have the automatic right to live and work in any of the other 31 EEA countries. A small, but increasing subset of these naturalised migrants is making use of this right through ‘onward’ or secondary migration flows (flows B2→C2 and B3→C3 in Figure 1). The fact that non-EU migrants have been consistently more mobile than EU natives (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010) suggests that this type of extrazens collective is likely to grow in the near future, especially after the economic crisis which has hit some countries in the euro area.

However, naturalised citizens ‘disappear’ from official statistics joining all other nationals from the moment they acquire their new citizenship status. One option at attempting to track this elusive extrazens population would be to combine citizenship and country of birth information at the individual level. Such a combination at the individual level is only available in nine EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden) comprising just 22% of the total EU population. In these countries 1.75% of the population (1.9 million) were born outside of the EU but had EU citizenship in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012b), and 5.8% of these individuals (or 0.1% of the total population of these countries) held EU citizenship for a country different to that of their country of residence.

Insert Table 1 about here

Other data sources available are national surveys, which increasingly ask respondents for
both citizenship and country of birth. The European Social Survey (ESS) is well established and has a common methodology and sampling framework across most of the EU27 countries (European Social Survey, 2012). Table 1 shows the results from pooling together over 200,000 individual responses across five rounds of the ESS from the EU27 countries available (2002-2010). It can clearly be seen that 2.52% of ESS respondents were born outside of the EU but hold citizenship of the country where they reside, and a further 0.06% have EU citizenship of a country other than that of their country of residence. Furthermore, 0.13% has been born in the EU but lack EU citizenship, a discriminated section of denizens.

Comparing both the ESS survey data with the official statistics of the nine individual countries noted earlier, a number of conclusions can be made. The resident population born outside the EU but with EU citizenship is between 1.75% (12 countries) and 2.58% (ESS), probably because the large countries of naturalisation are missing from the nine individual countries, apart from obvious methodological differences. These two rates would place the number of EU citizens born outside the EU as between 8.8 and 12.7 million residents. The aforementioned gross difference between the total number of non-EU born and EU citizens is 10.2 million residents, and this falls neatly in the middle of such a range. Furthermore, those born outside the EU but with an EU citizenship other than that of their country of residence are between 0.06% (ESS) and 0.1% (nine countries), or 0.3 to 0.5 million residents. This is a first size estimate of part of the extrazen collective, the ‘within-the-EU’ side of the equation. Hence this figure actually includes two of the extrazens types noted previously; naturalised intra-EU migrants, discussed in this section, as well as those who migrate to the EU through three-way intergenerational migration, as will be discussed later in section d).

Qualitative analyses of intra-EU flows of naturalised migrants are very useful to illustrate the actual trajectories adopted. A recently studied case involves various Somali, Iraqui and other refugee communities, who after living for a number of years and naturalising in a first EU country of shelter - typically Sweden, Netherlands or Denmark - then decide to migrate to the
UK (van Liempt, 2011; Lindley & van Hear, 2007). Another interesting example is Colombian-born British citizens who arrived as refugees and some of whom later moved to Spain for family and cultural reasons (INE, 2012a). This group also has an opposite flow; Colombian-born naturalised Spanish citizens who have moved to the UK for work reasons after the economic crisis struck Spain (McIlwaine et al., 2011). In a large survey of Latin American-born migrants living in London, 25% of respondents had a British passport and a further 19% an EU citizenship other than British (McIlwaine et al., 2011). Latin Americans are a growing collective of EU migrants that represent well the convoluted mobility trajectories assessed in this paper, and thus will be frequently mentioned in the examples provided.

Through these examples and preliminary statistics on naturalised intra-EU migrants it is hoped that some initial attention has been drawn to the trajectories of migrants that do not fit the neatly defined origin-destination bipolar categories of movement established by the migration and transnationalism literature. Moreover, the bulk of extrazens actually fall within the types discussed in the following subsections.

c) Ancestry and/or ‘at birth’ acquisition of citizenship

Naturalisation represents only a sub-section of the total number of acquisitions of EU citizenship. Waldrauch suggests that ‘automatic’ or ‘at birth’ acquisitions of citizenship ‘in some states […] will represent a sizable proportion of all acquisitions’ (Waldrauch, 2006: 278). In other words, those who access citizenship through descent-based or family-related provisions, both within and outside the EU (movements between cells A1→A2 and A1→A3 in Figure 1), as well as through birth-right citizenship (*ius soli*); this group is not discussed in this paper (see Honohan, 2010). Official statistics do not usually capture ‘at birth’ access to citizenship because of the fundamental premise that these individuals are considered citizens from birth, regardless of the age at which they acquire or ‘recover’ their citizenship of an EU member state. Hence records for a substantial part of acquisition or attribution of EU citizenship remain hidden somewhere within mundane registrar’s books, passport requests or consulate’s certificates of
birth. Part of this collective lie within the aforementioned 10.2 million EU citizens and residents born outside the EU, but a much larger number of extrazens actually live outside the EU. The scarce evidence available will now be reviewed.

Germany alone granted citizenship to 2.4 million descendants of ‘ethnic Germans’ (*aussiedlers*) between 1990 and 2005, most of them from the ex-Soviet Union, making a total of 4.48 million since 1950 (Jennissen, 2011). In the last few years Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, all EU member states, have introduced laws to grant citizenship to several million ‘extraterritorial kin minorities’, many of whom live outside the EU in Ukraine, Serbia, Russia, or Moldova (Iordachi, 2010). Considering historical European emigration we could ask ourselves; how many descendants of the 60 million European emigrants to America and Australasia between 1815- 1930 (Baines, 1995) have a right to EU citizenship today? In a classic paper titled ‘*How 4.5 million Irish immigrants became 40 million Irish Americans*’ Hout and Goldstein (1994) proposed demographic models to explain processes of natural change and ethnic affiliation in the US leading to the current 150 million Americans that in the 1990 Census claimed genealogical ties with just four European nations (Great Britain, Ireland, Germany and Italy). The last three of these nations, together with several other traditional emigrant nations to America and Australasia, such as Greece or Poland, recognise some sort of *ius sanguinis* transmission of citizenship over some generations. Therefore, their US, Canadian, or Australian descendants who might be interested in temporarily living in Europe find that ancestry is a much easier path to legal status than attempting to extend their work, tourist or student visa (Anagnostou, 2011; Tintori, 2009).

Even when the UK only allows for one generation transmission of citizenship for descendants of nationals born abroad, 7.6 million people living outside Britain are estimated to be entitled to a British passport (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006). When these are added to the existing 6 million British nationals living abroad, the diaspora of British citizens rises to 13.6 million, comprising 22% of the current UK resident population (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006).
Additional estimates by these authors place at 44.4 million the population who have British ancestry in the censuses of just the US, Canada and Australia, although most of them would not be entitled to citizenship.

The Italian case is even more relevant to the extrazens collective since there are no generational limits to the transmission of Italian citizenship other than one’s emigrant ancestor having died after the creation of the Italian state on March 17th 1861. In other words, before this date there was no Italian nation. It has been estimated that 60 million people, mostly in the Americas, could currently be entitled to Italian citizenship worldwide (Tintori, 2009) – a figure larger than the current resident population of Italy and equivalent to 12% of the current EU population. However, there are only 4.1 million Italian citizens currently registered abroad (Italian Ministry of Interior, 2012), and although many others outside this figure register directly at the Italian commune where their ancestors were born (Tintori, 2009), such a mass growth of Italian citizenship is not likely to occur. Extremely long waiting lists of up to 20 years in some consulates (Tintori, 2009), together with the difficulty of locating all the required historical documents, actually act as practical deterrents to accessing Italian citizenship. Furthermore, there has to be a specific reason to overcome the hurdles of claiming a second passport.

From the country of ‘origin’ perspective, a renewed interest in an EU passport is usually triggered by economic or political turmoil. For example, after the unravelling of the Argentinean crisis of 2001, more than 400,000 requests for Spanish passports were received through consulates in that country (El Pais, 2003). In other cases, changes in citizenship legislation either in an EU country or in the ‘origin’ countries, initiates interest in finding a way of securing an EU passport. For example, in 2007 Spain passed a law granting citizenship to grandchildren of Spanish Civil War refugees who emigrated in the 1930s and 40s, mostly to Latin America. During the three year period opened to receive applications (2008-2011), 0.5 million valid claims have been processed through 815,000 individual appointments at Spanish consulates (Izquierdo, 2011). The fact that 30% of all applications are from Cuba is symptomatic of the aforementioned
value of an EU passport, since for most Cubans a foreign passport is the only option to be allowed to leave the island. However, this new law triggered a wider interest in multiple citizenship, mobilizing large communities of Spanish descendants over the internet. Through this process many of them found that they already had a birth right to Spanish nationality under pre-existing laws, and hence these ‘routine’ citizenship registrations are not reflected in the above figures.

These hand-picked examples illustrate how ancestry access to EU citizenship is granted without migration, a change in legal status (from cell A1→A2 or A1→A3 in Figure 1) that facilitates ulterior migratory movement to the EU (B2 and B3), bypassing immigration restrictions (B1). This route gives an indication of the potential implications of generous ius sanguinis provisions in some EU countries. It also exposes the discriminatory nature of nationality law over long-term denizens and migrants without an ancestral connection to Europe, and how it forms a potential political minefield between member states in times of economic hardship.

\textit{d) Three-way ‘intergenerational’ migration}

Some extrazens use ancestry-based citizenship to migrate directly to EU countries other than the one that granted them citizenship (routes A2→C2 and A3→B3 in Figure 1). This route can be termed ‘three-way migration’ (Durand and Massey, 2010), in which the country of citizenship is used instrumentally as a ‘springboard’ to access other countries.

As such, there are multiple accounts of Latin American migrants of Italian, Spanish, Portuguese or even German and Greek descent, who have acquired the nationality of these countries to then migrate to a different EU country (e.g. Guarnizo, 2008; McIlwaine et al., 2011). Tintori (2011) suggests the use of the term ‘Latin American Italians’ (LAIs) for the large number of Italian citizens born in that subcontinent. For example, only 48% of the 188,000 Italian nationals living in Spain were born in Italy, with 27% of these Italian nationals actually being born in Argentina (INE, 2012a). Furthermore, approximately a third of Argentinean-born
migrants residing in the UK or in Spain possess an Italian passport (UK Labour Force Survey, 2011; INE, 2012a). This type of Latin American extrazens access EU citizenship through *ius sanginis* provisions in Italy, Portugal and Spain, and then migrate to reside in other parts of the EU (Almeida, 2007; Guarnizo, 2008; McIlwaine *et al.*, 2011).

Other examples are Israeli citizens claiming German or Polish citizenship to gain access to other parts of the EU (Hirsch and Lazar, 2011), African migrants from ex-Portuguese colonies migrating to Britain after accessing Portuguese citizenship (Almeida, 2007), or descendants of Greek or Cypriot migrants in Australia or North America, recovering their ancestors’ citizenship just in case they wish to travel to Northwest Europe (Anagnostou, 2011). Others do not even have the intention of migrating but use EU citizenship to access a global space of free circulation, bypassing visa restrictions worldwide, for example to travel to the US without a visa (Tintori, 2009). It is precisely this global space of circulation that is most difficult to grasp and comprehend.

e) **External citizenship, ‘return’ and circularity**

Finally, increasing circular migratory flows between EU and non-EU countries (flows to/from cells A2 and A3 in Figure 1) are creating a growing contingent of external citizen populations worldwide.

The few recent studies available, show that there is a growing population of several million external EU citizens (Anagnostou, 2011; Almeida, 2007; Gonzalez-Enriquez, 2012; Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; Tintori, 2009). Such a collective is extremely difficult to measure because of the fundamental premise that external citizens are beyond the jurisdictionally reach of the state and registration with consulates is generally voluntary. There are two methodological approaches available: (a) the origin country view implies using external citizens’ registers, passport issuance, and emigration statistics, but these are highly incomplete or unavailable; and (b) the destination country view implies using statistics of non-nationals and/or foreign born populations published by destination states. Even within the highly coordinated EU
mobility space, reconciling origin and destination migration statistics has proved to be a daunting task (Poulain et al., 2006). Furthermore, nationality and country of birth information have not been routinely collected together until very recently, mainly in the 2010/2011 round of censuses. In some countries, data regarding the multiple nationalities of respondents have also been collected in the census and this will doubtless result in new issues on double counting the same people when compiling cross-national citizenship statistics. At the time of writing, these census statistics are not broadly available but they are likely to shed an important new light on the increasingly complex combinations of life course geography, residence and legal status (for a comparison on migration and identity census variables in 20 countries see Mateos, forthcoming).

Insert Table 2 about here

Table 2 summarises the scarce information available on external citizens. These figures should always be interpreted with caution, since they are based on overlapping definitions and use various assumptions on an individual country basis. In the 2000/2001 Censuses there were 15.3 million EU27 nationals living outside the EU/EEA (3.1% of today’s EU27 population) according to the University of Sussex Global Migrant Origin Database (GMOD) (Parsons et al., 2007). Additionally, as shown in the last three columns of Table 2, more up-to-date information is provided for six countries as available from official or other sources. These data consistently indicate that the most recent figures on EU nationals abroad are between 30-60% higher than the GMOD 2001 database, comprising an average of 8% of the resident population. Hence the current size of this collective outside the EU/EEA could well be between 20 and 25 million for all EU27 countries. In other words, the size of the EU external citizens collective is very similar

3

The Sussex Global Origin Database compiles migration stock statistics from censuses worldwide. Version 4 utilised here uses a combination of nationality and country of birth to determine the ‘origin’ of a migrant, and hence all ‘migrants’ reported might not be nationals of their country of birth.
to the number of non-EU nationals resident within the EU.

If those extrazens with the right to claim EU citizenship through ancestry are also counted as potential EU citizens, estimates of the extrazen population worldwide could well reach between 150-250 million (just the six countries alone in the last column of Table 2 add up to 242 million). However, these are highly speculative figures and they risk counting multiple times the same individual with various ancestry linages to several EU countries. If interested at all in gaining EU citizenship, only one of such linages will be eventually used, and hence only one EU passport will generally be produced. As an Argentinean company that helps to get a ‘European passport’ puts it: ‘fill in your genealogical tree and we will work out the most convenient path to European citizenship, the fastest route and a citizenship transferable to your children’ (http://ciudadaniaseuropeas.com/ [in Spanish] last accessed 12/06/2012).

Insert Table 3 about here

Spain is a good case study to explore the complex characteristics of extrazens, since a broad range of statistics are produced for external citizens by the National Statistical Institute broken down by country of birth (INE, 2012a; INE, 2012b), and a summary of these are provided in Table 3. There are 1.2 million Spanish citizens living outside the EU/EEA, and remarkably 68% of them were actually born in the country where they reside, while a further 5% were born in other countries outside Spain. That is, 73% of these external Spanish citizens are either descendants of Spanish emigrants or naturalised ‘return migrants’, not the typical ‘expatriates’ or first generation Spanish emigrants. Furthermore, these figures only include citizens who have voluntarily registered with Spanish consulates, and hence the true figures are likely to be higher. Finally, INE also breaks down the population resident in Spain by citizenship and country of birth, as shown in the first two rows of Table 3. This table shows the sharp contrasts between population groups that fall on different sides of the legal and national borders; 49 million people with different types of ties to Spain. For example, the 0.4 million foreigners born and living in Spain (almost 1% of the resident population), deprived from ius soli
citizenship, are in sharp contrast with the 1.3 million residents born abroad who are Spanish citizens and the over 1 million Spaniards that were born and reside abroad. This latter collective of extrazens has been increasing very rapidly, and as shown in Figure 2, it accounts for most of the 7.8% annual growth in Spanish external citizenship since 2009, the first year these statistics were reported. Such growth indicates two distinct processes over the last four years; an increase in naturalised migrants ‘returning’ or emigrating elsewhere as a result of the economic crisis, and a growth of ancestry-based access to citizenship, triggered by the aforementioned events as well as the 2007 ‘historic memory’ act. The cross-tabulations shown in Table 3 are a good indication of what type of citizenship and residence statistics should be made available in the future across the EU, taking a broad definition of the whole ‘EU population’, including all extrazen types.

5. Conclusions

This paper has laid out a range of new external and multiple citizenship practices in the EU, focussing on an understudied subset of EU citizens termed here as extrazens. This is a growing collective of EU citizens whose trajectories do not conform to traditional conceptions of citizenship acquisition through the expected route of unidirectional migration, settlement and naturalisation. Although such practices are increasingly common worldwide, it is argued that in the context of a highly integrated EU they have far-reaching and understudied implications for the future of the institution of citizenship. This is primarily because of the unique position of the EU as the first supra-national but ‘nested’ citizenship regime (Faist, 2007). Taken together, a majority of EU extrazens practices typified here seem to have passed unnoticed in the citizenship and migration literature.

Throughout the paper recent theoretical and empirical trends have been discussed, and a template to map out extrazens’ legal and mobility trajectories has been proposed. Five distinct, albeit interrelated processes have been identified; a) naturalisation, b) intra-EU onward migration, c) ancestry or ‘at birth’ acquisition of citizenship, d) three-way ‘intergenerational’ migration, and e) external citizenship, ‘return’ and circularity. Where possible, these processes
have been illustrated with empirical examples and statistical evidence to reveal the key characteristics, geographies and orders of magnitude. This exercise clearly indicates that there is a lack of knowledge regarding two distinct processes; 1) ‘automatic’ or ‘at birth’ acquisition of citizenship regardless of residence, and 2) intra-EU and extra-EU migration of ‘new EU nationals’. Such a void presents far reaching and critical implications for migration and integration policies across the EU, since the mechanisms that delineate who is considered a European citizen, a full member of the EU polity, are largely unknown.

Because of such a lack of evidence, citizenship preferences granted by EU member states to populations considered culturally and ethnically close to ‘the Nation’, regardless of residence history, linguistic ability or degree of social integration, have largely remained unchallenged. As such, the ‘birthright lottery’ of where one happens to be born and/or what bloodline one inherits ‘operates as a distributor (or denier) of opportunity on a global scale’ (Shachar, 2009: ix). Meanwhile, European scholarly and public policy attention has primarily focussed on immigrant naturalisation on a country by country basis, as opposed to examining all modes of citizenship acquisition and taking a cross-EU perspective. Consequently, more ‘culturally and ethnically distant’ migrants face increasing obstacles as Europe’s multiculturalist policies give way to assimilationist and anti-immigration discourses. The result of what Joppke (2005) has termed a tension between re-ethnicisation and de-ethnicisation of citizenship, is a quickly expanding but very unequal EU citizenry. Furthermore, such tension has created contradictions in policy that might cause serious strains and conflict in the near future between member states and between different immigrant population groups (denizens or alien residents and extrazens). In-depth knowledge of how these citizenship policies and migrant practices could drive conflict between member states and population groups is of utmost importance for future EU migration, social and even economic policies.

As a result, the consequences of extrazenship for its member states, as well as for migrant’s life opportunities across the world, have not been studied empirically beyond narrow
national and isolated disciplinary perspectives. In particular, there is a lack of multi-country comparative empirical studies that analyse migrants’ citizenship decision-making in the light of increasing transnational practices and beyond the origin-destination binary, in order to better understand how migrants ‘enact citizenship’ (Ehrkamp & Leitner, 2003). We also need to know more about how migrants themselves negotiate external and multiple citizenships. This includes understanding the strategies followed by extrazens in choosing or rejecting multiple citizenship, the actual nationalities preferred by individuals, as well as ethnic/national groups and the reasons behind their choices (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Amongst others, these will include the roles of state actors who resist or embrace external and multiple citizenship, and the consequences of their policy decisions and administrative practices for migrants and their families across various countries and generations (Kivisto and Faist, 2007). A large list of research questions about EU extrazens remains unanswered, including: What does their geography of ‘citizenship, migration and residency constellations’ (Bauböck, 2010a) look like? What are their key characteristics and future scenarios? How do they navigate the legal system and retrieve genealogical information to construct citizenship and migratory strategies? What do they actually use EU citizenship for? Does a EU passport encourage circular flows rather than permanent settlement? Even when they do gain EU citizenship, do immigrants and their descendants hold ‘second-class citizenship’ (Bloemraad et al., 2008)?

Beyond the data demands on extrazens made throughout the paper, understanding such complex mobility and legal trajectories and practices will also require the use of large scale qualitative research methods. One alternative method is the qualitative analysis of migrants’ experiences posted on the internet, such as in discussion forums, blogs and self-help websites. In Mateos and Durand (2012) we show initial evidence, collected from an internet discussion forum on Spanish nationality, on the various practices typically followed by EU extrazens across Southern Europe and Latin America. This initial analysis revealed that extrazens’ flexible citizenship and migration trajectories are largely independent of, and sometimes contradict or
bypass, the aims of nationally based citizenship and migration policies.

A better understanding of extrazenship will lead to new theoretical formulations of the institutions of citizenship and the nation state, under conditions of mobility, circular migration, and transgenerational transmission of state membership. This paper has attempted to make a small contribution towards opening up the relationship between the nation state and its citizens, through the unique example of EU extrazens. This collective forms an early testimony of the growing disjuncture between citizens’ geographical presence and political membership. They are also very useful to illustrate a set of on-going processes of spatiotemporal fragmentation of national membership, residence, territorial jurisdiction, nationhood and identity that are well underway in the EU and worldwide. The future consequences of such processes for the relationship between the nation state and its citizens – broadly defined by universal human rights and people’s sovereignty since the late 18th century – are far-reaching and largely unknown.
References

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Figure 1: Diagram of extrazens’ citizenship and migration trajectories around a EU ‘country of interest’
Figure 2: Number of Spanish external citizens by country of birth (2009-2012)

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, 2012b)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>EU In country</th>
<th>Other EU</th>
<th>Non EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU In country</td>
<td>91.77%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>92.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU</td>
<td>1.78%</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96.07%</td>
<td>2.12%</td>
<td>1.81%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1**: Proportion of European Social Survey respondents by citizenship and country of birth (2002-2010)

The five rounds of the ESS for the EU27 countries available were pooled together comprising a total sample of 207,986 individuals. No weighting per country was applied.

*Source: European Social Survey (2012)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Non-nationals</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>Naturalised 98-2010 (Cumulative)</th>
<th>Emigrants (GMOD 2001)</th>
<th>Emigrants (recent sources)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Residents in Non-EU/EEA</td>
<td>Nationals abroad % of pop Ancestry based descendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8,404</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10,951</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7,505</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10,533</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,561</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,375</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65,048</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>8,078</td>
<td>2,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>81,752</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>8,078</td>
<td>2,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11,310</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9,986</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4,481</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>60,626</td>
<td>3,235</td>
<td>3,629</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>1,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3,245</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>16,656</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>1,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10,637</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,983</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21,414</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2009/11</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>46,153</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>4,214</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9,416</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>62,499</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>4,910</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>4,202</td>
<td>3,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EU27</td>
<td></td>
<td>502,540</td>
<td>20,473</td>
<td>32,382</td>
<td>8,858</td>
<td>27,794</td>
<td>15,347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: A summary of available statistics on EU external citizens (thousands)

Sources:
‘Total Population’ and ‘Non-EU immigrants’ (year of reference) sourced from Eurostat (2012b); ‘Naturalised (98-2010)’ sourced from Eurostat (2012a); ‘Emigrants (GMOD 2001)’ (Global Migration Origin Database) sourced from Parsons et al, (2007); ‘Nationals abroad’ sourced from official statistics and ‘Ancestry based descendants’ from grey literature and sources of various quality as per the following letter codes indicated next to each figure: a) French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007); b) El Nuevo Mercurio (2009); c) Bundeszentrale für politische bildung (2010); d) Sebök, L. (2010); e) Ministerio del Interno (2010); f) Tintori (2009); g) Observatorio da emigracao (2011); h) Observatorio da emigracao (2009); i) INE (2012b); j) El Pais (2003); k) Sriskandarajah and Drew (2006).
## Table 3: Citizens, denizens and extrazens Spanish statistics (2012)

*Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE, 2012a; b)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td>406,814</td>
<td>5,344,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Citizens</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40,105,840</td>
<td>1,333,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU/EEA</td>
<td>320,624</td>
<td>236,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-EU/EEA</td>
<td>333,771</td>
<td>821,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total - citizens &amp; denizens</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,167,049</td>
<td>7,735,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other or N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE, 2012a; b)*