Removal Roulette:
Does Place Matter for Predicting Deportation Rates under Secure Communities?

ABSTRACT

As deportations from the U.S. have risen, county jails have become a key stage where authorities address immigration challenges. In recent years, local entities have undertaken unprecedented action to address such challenges, including controversial steps to investigate immigrants’ legal status. Do state and local immigration initiatives predict immigration enforcement outcomes? Federal authorities outlined enforcement priorities through Secure Communities, a data-sharing program designed to identify removable immigrants. This paper uses county-level data and multivariate analyses to examine factors related to deportation outcomes. Although regional context explains some variation in enforcement indicators, other factors also matter. Places with especially beleaguered economies, extensive jail personnel, and high drug crime rates report higher deportation rates. Unlike policies designed to provide relief from deportation, partisanship and restrictive immigration experiments also predict deportation rates. Predictors of deportation rates appear to operate before the booking stage. In sum, Secure Communities operates in jurisdictions with divergent local contexts.

Juan M. Pedroza
Sociology Department
Stanford University
jpedroza@stanford.edu
Removal Roulette: 
Does Place Matter for Predicting Deportation Rates under Secure Communities?

INTRODUCTION

The number of deportations (“removals and returns”) from the United States has grown tremendously in the past 15 years. At the same time, immigrant settlement patterns across the country resulted in a dispersal of foreign-born populations. Suddenly, local communities with limited experience responding to recent immigration face new challenges. In this context, the federal government claims power over immigration matters while and state and local actors attempt to do the same. In addition, county jails have become an important stage where authorities attempt to resolve challenges related to immigration. This paper examines the Secure Communities immigration enforcement program to address a key question emerging in the evolving enforcement landscape: do state and local immigration initiatives predict immigration enforcement outcomes?

The immigration enforcement landscape now stretches across country. The US-Mexico border no longer dominates immigration enforcement activity in the US. Secure Communities, a Department of Homeland Security immigration enforcement program, expanded rapidly after its inception in October 2008, and it will be active in all jurisdictions by 2013 (Rosenblum & Kandel, 2011). Now active in 97 percent of counties across the country, Secure Communities deportations from the interior (i.e., beyond US-Mexico border states) account for nearly a third of all deportations. The task of explaining how the emerging enforcement climate reflects local dynamics looms large.

Local communities assess immigration dilemmas differently. A select group of localities see themselves as sanctuaries for all immigrants, regardless of immigration status (Ridgley, 2008). At the same time, legislators—mostly, but not exclusively, in the southeast and
southwest—continue to experiment with increasingly restrictive measures designed to repeal unauthorized immigrants. Few places fall into either extreme. Given the diversity of local contexts, communities face distinct immigration challenges. Detention processes are no exception. Secure Communities data afford opportunities to analyze diverse responses to immigration evident in deportation outcomes.

Secure Communities fits into a broader enforcement context, yet the program remains unique. Unlike other federal enforcement initiatives that rely on federal authorities investigating immigration violations, Secure Communities program is not designed as a personnel-driven investigations operation. Instead of adding enforcement staff, Secure Communities is a technological screening system, and—unlike other programs—it operates in nearly all jurisdictions. When local officers book someone, Secure Communities receives a submission of the arrestees’ biometrics. The federal government then checks fingerprints against federal databases with information about country of origin and legal status. The routine background check thus transforms into a query of each person’s immigration status (Pedroza, 2013).

This paper examines how local contexts can explain variations in deportation outcomes across the country. The analyses below identify a range of social, economic, and political predictors of enforcement activity. The results reveal a diverse immigration enforcement landscapes. Local communities differ along a range of dimensions, and local capacity for deportation (and discretion regarding deportable inmates) cannot be understood without accounting for measures of geography, the economy, crime, partisanship, and—to a lesser extent—jail capacity. In addition, restrictive measures appear to outweigh initiatives designed to provide relief from deportation, resulting in an acceleration of deportations that appears to operate prior to the booking process.
LITERATURE

Public policy and immigration enforcement can shape immigrants’ ‘modes of incorporation’ (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). If context matters, sociological theories about how and why context influences immigrants’ lived experiences remain mostly limited to established immigrant destinations. Theoretical explanations of the determinants and consequences of local responses to immigration dilemmas have generally lagged behind demographic analyses of immigrant settlement in new and emerging destinations. A growing body of research has begun to explain and measure local experiments designed to protect or repel immigrants.

Most research focuses on measures inspired by animosity toward immigrants. Efforts to protect immigrants’ rights and access to social resources exist, and one study attempts to measure immigration climate as a net of both restrictive and integrative experiments (Pham & Van, 2013). Amidst the growing work on restrictive experiments, two theories hold promise for future research. Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram (2012) view restrictive experiments as emanating from purposive actors: taking advantage of limited knowledge of immigration in key places; effectively utilizing rhetoric about autonomy (or devolution); recruiting others outside the scope of immigration-related issues; and halting legislative action at the national level. A competing theory focuses less on mobilized and well-connected actors and more on flawed institutions and organizations across levels of jurisdiction. Cuéllar (2012) posits an inadequate and dysfunctional immigration system resulting from flawed attempts to reform immigration law in previous eras; organizational fragmentation results preventing interagency cooperation; and limited presidential control over an unwieldy immigration system. Both theories agree that a polarized public debate regarding immigration fuels experiments at the local level. Yet the contrasting theories mostly attribute the source of such experiments to different phenomena.
Table 1: Research on Determinants & Effects of Restrictive Immigration Experiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictive immigration experiments</th>
<th>Determinants (predictors of support or passage of experiments)</th>
<th>Effects (population change)</th>
<th>Other Effects (wages &amp; employment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>287(g) programs</td>
<td>Creek &amp; Yoder (2012); Wong (2012)</td>
<td>Capps et. al. (2011); Guterbock et. al. (2010); O’Neil (2013); Parrado (2012); Singet et. al. (2009)</td>
<td>Bohn &amp; Santillano (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287(g) plus other state-local initiatives</td>
<td>0’Neil (2012)</td>
<td>Leerkes et. al. (2012); 0’Neil (2011); Pedroza (2012); Sturtevant (2010)</td>
<td>Pham &amp; Van (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most empirical research focuses on measuring the determinants or consequences of restrictive experiments. As displayed in Table 1, several studies attempt to predict the ascendance of restrictive experiments or public attitudes in support of limiting immigration. Taken together, their implications are not immediately clear. Not only do existing studies employ different methods and data, but predictors across studies vary. Although few of these studies account for social, political, and economic factors in tandem, a number of suggestive findings emerge from their collective work. First, opinions hostile to immigration (Hopkins, 2010) or partisanship (Casellas & Leal, 2013; Creek & Yoder, 2012; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Wong, 2012) tend to predict proposed or actual restrictive experiments. Second, economic downturns function as determinants of restrictive experiments (Hopkins, 2010; O’Neil, 2011). Finally, rapid demographic change is related to restrictive experimentation (Creek & Yoder,
2012; Hopkins, 2010; O’Neil, 2011). Though these relationships sometimes appear contingent or interactive, restrictive experiments are at least partially responsive to some measure of a polarized citizenry, beleaguered economies, and phenomenal demographic turnover.

The largest body of research focuses on the effects of restrictive measures. Specifically, researchers tend to pay attention to population change and residential mobility following the proposal or enactment of such experiments. Indeed, the public and policymakers alike seem fixated on knowing whether (and how many) people leave town when a town or state passes a tough law targeting immigrants. Extant research on the effects of restrictive experiments examines (a) restrictive legislative experiments at the state level (e.g., omnibus laws covering a range of provisions or stand-alone bills mandating some form of employment authorization verification of new hires); (b) the role of state and local law enforcement in investigating immigration violations alongside federal authorities (also known as the 287(g) program described below); or a combination of both. The results of existing work are enlightening and complex.

Immigrants do not seem to leave en masse following restrictive experiments, especially not families with roots in a local community. But some people do seem to leave town, even if only temporarily, especially in places with steep economic downturns. State-specific studies of Virginia (Guterbock, et. al., 2010; Singer et. al., 2009; Sturtevant, 2010) and Oklahoma (García, 2012; Pedroza, 2012) provide contrasting insights into why immigrants might be more likely to leave a beleaguered economy. When assessing whether restrictive measures motivate immigrants to leave, a few studies measure the confounding effects of the latest economic downturn starting in 2007 (Lofstrom, Bohn, & Raphael, 2011; O’Neil, 2011; O’Neil, 2013; Parrado, 2012). Where evidence of out-migration emerges following restrictive experiments, a number of proposed and
overlapping explanations emerge: some immigrants left town (which may have changed the composition of the local foreign-born population) but may have returned shortly thereafter; projected in-migration leveled off; some immigrants went into hiding or sought self-employment to avoid detection; some immigrants decided to become naturalized citizens; and the combination of a hard-hit economy and tough measures motivated some immigrants to relocate (Capps et. al. 2011; Guterbock et. al., 2010; Leerkes, Leach, & Bachmeier, 2012; Lofstrom, Bohn, & Raphael, 2011; O’Neil, 2011; Pedroza, 2012). A number of other studies examine other consequences of restrictive experiments (Bachmeier et. al. 2012; Bohn & Lofstrom, 2012; Bohn & Santillano, 2012; Pham & Van, 2010) or an unwelcoming climate (Filindra et. al., 2011).

The collective research briefly summarized above greatly advances knowledge of restrictive immigration experiments at the state and local level. Yet research on immigration enforcement outcomes at the local level remains a gap in the literature. Studies of local entities addressing immigration-related challenges focus on explaining local action. Research on the effects of such local action has yet to explore enforcement outcomes, instead favoring demographic (or, sometimes, economic) consequences. Since enhanced deportation is the explicit purpose of many restrictive experiments, research on deportation outcomes would prove instructive. Two papers use survey data to analyze deportation and migratory behavior (Amuedo-Dorantes, Puttitanun, & Martinez-Donate, 2013; Rocha, 2011). However, no research on restrictive experiments explicitly links local contexts and Secure Communities outcomes.

This paper contributes to the growing literature on restrictive immigration experiments (Dowling & Inda, 2013). The analyses below examine deportation outcomes under Secure Communities. The results have implications for research on the determinants and effects of restrictive experiments. First, on the determinants side, the findings below suggest a range of
social, political, and economic phenomena predict which places deport many more people than others. Second, on the effects side, social forces linked to immigration control measures predict restrictive deportation outcomes operating before the booking stage of the arrest and detention process.

**PREDICTING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT OUTCOMES**

This paper examines local Secure Communities deportation outcomes. First, the results below predict deportation rates, or Secure Communities removals and returns divided by the local non-citizen population per years active in Secure Communities:

\[
\text{Deportation rate} = \frac{\text{(Number of cumulative Secure Communities removals and returns in a county)}}{\left(\frac{\text{(estimated number of non-citizens in a county, per 1,000)}}{\times (1/12 \times \text{number of months since county activated Secure Communities participation})}\right)}
\]

The deportation rate relies on Secure Communities data for removals and returns and time elapsed since each jurisdiction began participating in Secure Communities. This paper relies on estimates of the number of non-citizens in a county (per thousand) based on the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) population estimates from the 2006-10 five-year sample. The number of non-citizens and Hispanics are very closely related (correlation: 0.97), which suggests the findings would be largely unchanged if we calculated deportation rates per Hispanics in a county. Local deportation rates capture variation in Secure Communities outcomes from one community to the next. In places with small immigrant populations, the formula above proves sensitive to small changes in the numerator (removals and returns). As such, this paper limits the analyses below to counties (N=533) with more than 5,000 immigrants.¹

¹ The analysis sample excludes the headquarters of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Walker County, TX),
Second, this paper also presents results predicting a measure of discretion. Discretion refers to the range in how many people are deported after their biometrics taken at the booking stage indicates they may be removable. Using data on biometric matches and deportations, the findings examine a ratio of deportations per total matches in a county.

\[
\text{Discretion ratio} = \frac{\text{Number of cumulative Secure Communities removals and returns in a county}}{\text{Number of cumulative Secure Communities biometric matches in a county}}
\]

The ratio captures variation in places that remove a high portion of removable inmates compared to places that deport a smaller share of removable immigrants. The discretion outcome can range from 0 to 100 in our sample. A high score indicates limited discretion because a county ends up deporting a high proportion of removable inmates. A low score corresponds to heightened discretion, or relief from deportation.

The two enforcement indicators capture overlapping outcomes (correlation: 0.68), but they are not substitute measures. Deportation rates capture local capacity to net and remove removable immigrants. The discretion ratio captures how many (or few) removable inmates in custody are actually deported.

In order to identify determinants of deportation outcomes, this paper explores a range of explanatory factors: region; arrests; unemployment; and law enforcement agency (LEA) capacity at the federal and local level; partisanship; and detention policy indicators. Related immigration policy research finds regional variation is related to restrictive immigration enforcement. Specifically, patterns of immigration enforcement in southern states and U.S.-Mexico border states generally diverge from the rest of the country (Creek & Yoder, 2012; O’Neil, 2011; Wong,
This paper includes indicators for counties in either region. Similarly, the models below also include a dummy variable for six outlier counties, as described in the results section. In addition, as described below, this paper accounts for federal LEA deportation capacity by including jails active in federal deportation prior to Secure Communities.

DATA & METHODS

Until now, research on state and local intervention in immigration matters has examined an uneven patchwork of laws, ordinances, and enforcement programs. For the first time ever, federal Secure Communities data allow for direct and systematic comparisons of enforcement indicators from one community to the next; across roughly 3,000 jurisdictions and nearly 247,000 removals and returns (as of December 2012). This paper relies on county-level data in 533 counties to explore the unfolding geography of Secure Communities enforcement. Taken together, these counties account for more than 90 percent of the nation’s foreign-born population as well as cumulative Secure Communities removals and returns. The remaining counties not included in the analysis are more sparsely populated and report few deportations.

Secure Communities deportation rates, as defined above, are the outcome variable. DHS Secure Communities publishes total reported “removals and returns” at the county level alongside the total number of biometric “submissions” from county jails (at the time of booking) and biometric “matches” linking foreign nationals to federal data. Local jurisdictions submit biometric data for all persons booked, not just immigrants (or people suspected of being foreign nationals). Since participation in Secure Communities rolled out nationwide on a staggered basis, the outcome variable accounts for the amount of time elapse since each jurisdiction began participating in Secure Communities.

2 13 southern states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 4 border states include: Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas.
This paper uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions to predict Secure Communities deportation rates at the county level. As detailed below, the predictors in the multivariate models capture variation by region, crime rates, economic context, partisanship, law enforcement capacity, and relevant policy variables.

1. **Crime**: The Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes county-level Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) with annual reported crimes—among youth and adults—and county population estimates. This paper calculates average arrest rates between 2007 (before the implementation of Secure Communities) and 2010 (the latest year of available UCR data) per 100 residents in a county. The models below account for drug arrest rates at the county level. Drug arrest rates capture county variation in drug-related offenses (especially aggravated felonies related to drugs) under immigration law.\(^3\)

2. **Economy**: The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) publishes annual employment figures at the county level. This paper calculates the average county-level unemployment rate from 2007 (before the implementation of Secure Communities) to 2011 (the latest year of available LAUS data).

3. **Law enforcement capacity**: This paper accounts for LEA capacity at the federal and local level. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University published the number of removals, returns, and exits (or “departures” which include deportations and release from DHS custody) across hundreds of jail facilities between April 2007 and March 2008, which precedes Secure Communities implementation. The data capture a snapshot of

---

\(^3\) UCR does not report information to generate drug arrest rates for Florida. Work is underway to add drug arrest rates to the 40 Florida counties included in the analyses presented in this paper.
federal capacity deployed at the local level. This paper accounts for counties whose jails reported at least 100 “departures.”

Moreover, the Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes a Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) every four years. The latest data reflect LEA capacity in 2008. This paper accounts for the number of local officers (full-time sworn personnel) per 1,000 residents in a county and excludes agencies with special responsibilities (e.g., park rangers, college campuses, excise). Two separate variables are included in the analyses: officers with law enforcement duties only and officers with jail duties only.

4. **Partisanship:** 2008 presidential election results reflect partisanship variation when Secure Communities launched. Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections transforms election results into votes per county. This paper accounts for the percent of county-level votes cast for the Republican presidential candidate, John McCain.

5. **Policy indicators:** Three county-level policy indicators capture whether local law enforcement agencies have taken steps to accelerate removals or to identify victims of crime eligible for relief from removal. Since these indicators are not mutually exclusive, an LEA(s) in a county may participate in none, one, two, or all of the initiatives below.

   In 2008, the CSLLEA began asking law enforcement agencies whether they participate in a “human trafficking task force,” which generally translates into a victim-centered approach to crime investigations (regardless of legal status). This paper generates an indicator variable: 0 if no agency in a county reported participating in a task force (N=2,155) and 1 if any agencies reported participating (N=981).

---

4 155 counties reported departures between April 2007 and March 2008 (TRAC, 2008). Departures from Pinal County are excluded due to the large number of facilities in the relatively small county.
In addition, an indicator variable identifies nine “sanctuary” counties. In each county, either a city or the entire county is generally recognized (Congressional Research Service, 2006; Ridgley, 2008) as a sanctuary for unauthorized immigrants. The designation dates back to the 1980s when local jurisdictions faced the prospect of turning over unauthorized immigrants in custody to immigration authorities amidst civil wars in Central America.

The two policy measures above may generally dampen deportation, except perhaps as a last resort or in cases of serious crime. Conversely, this paper also accounts for local places that collaborate with DHS to accelerate removals. Specifically, this paper creates an indicator variable for counties collaborating with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to investigate immigration violations through the 287(g) program, a federal-local partnership program named after a section in immigration law enacted in 1996. Such partnerships began mostly between 2007 and 2009. This paper accounts for 57 counties where agencies have signed 287(g) agreements with the federal government.

RESULTS

Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for variables examined in this paper. On average, the 533 counties in the sample reported between 3 and 4 (3.75) removals and returns per thousand non-citizens per years active in Secure Communities. A dummy variable for six outliers is included in the analysis to control for the potential effect of these counties in the multivariate models. Excluding outliers produces very similar results. The six “outlier” (due to the high volume of removal activity) counties are Maricopa County, AZ; Miami-Dade County, FL; Los Angeles County, CA; Harris County, TX; San Diego County, CA; and Orange County, CA.

---

5 Sanctuaries as defined in this paper include San Diego County, CA; Los Angeles County, CA; San Francisco County, CA; Montgomery County, MD; Middlesex County, MA; Ramsey County, MN; Hennepin County, MN; New York County, NY; Dane County, WI. Another sanctuary (Cook County) has no active Secure Communities program.

6 Excluding outliers produces very similar results. The six “outlier” (due to the high volume of removal activity) counties are Maricopa County, AZ; Miami-Dade County, FL; Los Angeles County, CA; Harris County, TX; San Diego County, CA; and Orange County, CA.
interest. The results are presented for the policy indicators alone (Models 1 and 3) and then for the full model (Models 2 and 4).

In the detention policy tug of war, restrictive experiments at the county level outweigh efforts to provide relief from deportation. Participation in the 287(g) program accelerates deportation rates and is related to higher discretion ratios (or limited relief from deportation). A sanctuary designation and anti-trafficking involvement are supposed to promote relief from removal by promoting discretion and protecting immigrant victims of crime. Neither policy reliably predicts Secure Communities deportation outcomes. They appear to make little or no difference in immigration enforcement among counties in the sample.

Three other factors make a difference for predicting deportation outcomes. Drug arrest rates, unemployment rates, and partisanship each accelerate deportations under Secure Communities. They increase the rate of deportation and limit discretion at the county level. The discussion section explores what these key factors might mean for interpreting the results.

Law enforcement capacity is weakly related to enforcement outcomes, if at all. Law enforcement officer capacity is unrelated to deportation rates and discretion ratios. Jail officer capacity is related to deportation rates but only in counties with large jail facilities, but it does not predict discretion ratios. Federal capacity is a proxy for places with a relationship with federal immigration authorities before the implementation of Secure Communities. Federal capacity promotes discretion (e.g., lower discretion ratios) in places with large immigrant inmate activity predating Secure Communities, but it does not predict deportation rates.

---

7 Statistical significance test results are included to identify estimates that accurately predict deportation outcomes versus factors that do a poor job of predicting the same outcomes. However, there is no uncertainty about the estimates themselves. In fact, the aggregate data are not based on a sample but instead capture factors (including deportation outcomes) operating in every county in the sample.
Regional context also matters for enforcement outcomes. Border counties report higher deportation rates and discretion ratios associated with limited relief from deportation. Southern states also report higher deportation rates, but the estimated effect of the being in the south on discretion ratios is imprecise.

Rapid change in the local immigrant population does not predict deportation outcomes. This is consistent with recent work on Congressional voting, which suggests partisanship explains voting behavior on immigration issues rather than population pressure (Casellas & Leal, 2013). In this case, it seems rapid in the immigrant share of a county population is not a good predictor of Secure Communities indicators, even though demographic turnover predicts other types of restrictive experiments. The result could mean that even in places with rapid demographic change, immigrants generally end up behind bars in very small numbers.

Late adoption of Secure Communities matters for enforcement outcomes. Yet the interpretation of the relationship remains unclear. Counties that did not begin participating in the program until January 2012 report lower rates of deportation and more discretion (i.e., lower discretion ratios). Perhaps these counties prolonged participation in the program because they were reluctant to remove inmates who committed minor offenses. Or perhaps the total number of deportations among late adopter counties lags because—compared to other places—inmates scheduled for removal have yet to finish their a sentence in detention.

Model 2 and 4 capture some of the variation in deportation rates (adjusted $R^2$: 0.2462) and the discretion ratio (adjusted $R^2$: 0.4327). Exceptions abound, and the final models are equally precise in predicting outcomes across all 533 counties. Yet the results for the main
variables discussed above (e.g., crime, economy, partisanship, participation in the 287(g) program) are not sensitive to changes in model specification.\(^8\)

The general results hold across both deportation outcomes of interest. If the predictors of the discretion ratio and deportation rates differed greatly, then perhaps distinct phenomena influence the two outcomes. However, the consistent results suggest predictors of deportation rates operate before the booking stage as evidenced in the analyses of discretion ratios.

**DISCUSSION**

Secure Communities receives widespread support as a means to identify and deport non-citizens behind bars. Enforcement outcomes are not uniform. Local dynamics make a difference when predicting variation in county-level Secure Communities enforcement outcomes. In addition to regional variation, the results suggest places with especially beleaguered economies and high drug crime rates report higher deportation rates and limit discretion (a proxy for relief for removal) at the county level. Moreover, partisanship and restrictive local deportation experiments also predict deportation rates, unlike measures designed to protect immigrants’ rights. In sum, Secure Communities operates in jurisdictions with divergent local contexts.

Predictors of deportation rates appear to operate before the booking stage. Indeed, three key predictors explain variation in both enforcement outcomes: partisanship, unemployment rate, and drug arrest rates. Although the analyses rely on macro-level data, the findings suggest that a number of potential phenomena influence or predict deportation outcomes. First, it appears places that supported the Republican Party in the 2008 general election in large margins tend to report more restrictive immigration enforcement outcomes. Partisanship, in other words, could be a proxy for general animus toward non-citizens. In addition, counties with a proven ability to report high drug arrest rates also tend to report higher deportation rates as well as higher

---

\(^8\) Contact author for results of model uncertainty tests of robustness and credibility.
discretion ratios. Such places may have developed an infrastructure or incentives to net drug crimes, many of which trigger removals among unauthorized and legal permanent resident alike. Finally, local places with especially beleaguered economies appear to be important sites of tension regarding immigrants behind bars. In these locations, the volume of removable inmates who end in removal or voluntary departure proceedings—rather than being released—exceeds other places. Perhaps non-citizens in places hit especially hard by the recession stand out more than other places.

**LIMITATIONS**

The results above recommend accounting for Secure Communities to study variation in local immigration policy contexts. A number of key limitations are worth noting. First, the analyses exclude more than 2,400 counties. Although these counties account for a small share of Secure Communities deportations, future work could combine contiguous counties to determine whether or not the relationships described above also hold for locations with small immigrant populations. Second, the outcome variable employs cumulative deportations. Future work could test the effects of the predictive factors in this paper on changes in deportation rates from one year to the next. Third, this paper treats counties as discrete entities that do not interact with each other across space. Future work could explore whether and how enforcement activity in a county (or a group of counties) influences enforcement activity in neighboring or nearby places. Fourth, the relationships described operate at the macro (county) level, yet the results presented above suggest activity at the individual or agency level—especially before the booking stage—also make a difference for deportation outcomes. Finally, the paper does not account for variation in (a) immigration ordinances, laws, and other legislative activities or (b) measures of racial and ethnic composition or animus.
REFERENCES


Note: County-level variables merged across datasets (ACS, 2012; FBI, 2012; BJS, 2011; BLS, 2012; DHS, 2012; Leip 2008; TRAC, 2008) plus indicators for US-Mexico border counties, outliers, and policy variables (CRS, 2006; Riddley, 2008). Analysis sample limited to counties with over 5,000 immigrants using five-year (2006-2010) Census estimates (ACS, 2012). Results cover removals & returns since the commencement of Secure Communities (October 2008) through June 2012. All figures exclude the headquarters of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Walker County, TX), which houses a large number of foreign-born inmates. Federal departures include people removed, released, or not in federal immigration detention between April 2007 and March 2008 (TRAC, 2008).
Table 2: Predicting Secure Communities Outcomes
LARGE COUNTY SAMPLE (OLS Results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Detention policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA(s) signed 287(g) agreement (0, 1)</td>
<td>2.20***</td>
<td>1.43**</td>
<td>6.94***</td>
<td>4.86***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA(s) participate in anti-trafficking task force (0, 1)</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctuary city/county (0, 1)</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-3.79</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisanship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. votes for John McCain in 2008 election</td>
<td>3.96***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demography</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born (pct. point change, 1990 to 2006-10)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern county (0, 1)</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>1.76*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border county (0, 1)</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>7.39***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secure Communities program indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late adopter (0, 1)</td>
<td>-1.38***</td>
<td>-6.84***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlier (0, 1)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-10.03*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (2007-2011 mean, per 100 workers)</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug arrest rate (2007-2010 mean, per 100 residents)</td>
<td>2.27***</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.35**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal and local law enforcement capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement officers (2008, per 1,000 residents)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jail officers (2008, per 1,000 residents)</td>
<td>1.50*</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal departures (2007-2008)</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.86***</td>
<td>-1.91*</td>
<td>14.41***</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>0.0317</td>
<td>0.2470</td>
<td>0.0464</td>
<td>0.4364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: County-level variables merged across datasets (ACS, 2012; FBI, 2012; BJS, 2011; BLS, 2012; DHS, 2012; Leip, 2008; TRAC, 2008) plus indicators for US-Mexico border counties, outliers, and policy variables (CRS, 2006; Ridgley, 2008). Analysis sample limited to counties with over 5,000 immigrants using five-year (2006-2010) Census estimates (ACS, 2012). Results cover removals & returns since the commencement of Secure Communities (October 2008) through December 2012. All figures exclude the headquarters of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Walker County, TX), which houses a large number of foreign-born inmates. Federal departures include people removed, released, or not in federal immigration detention between April 2007 and March 2008 (TRAC, 2008).

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).